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From Pluralism to Individualism: 
Berle and Means and 20th-Century 
American Legal Thought 
Dalia Tsuk 
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., and GARDINER C. MEANS. The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property. New York: Macmillan, 1932. Pp. 409. 
INTRODUCTION 
“The rise of the modern corporation,” Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. 
Means wrote in the last paragraph of The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property ( 1932), “has brought a concentration of economic power which can 
compete on equal terms with the modern state.” In the future, they predicted, 
the corporation could even supersede the state “as the dominant form of 
social organization.” “The law of corporations,” Berle and Means concluded, 
“might well be considered as a potential constitutional law for the new 
economic state, while business practice is increasingly assuming the aspect 
of economic statesmanship” (p. 357). 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property was one of the earliest 
attempts to connect the growth of giant corporations with the political and 
social changes occurring in a rapidly growing industrialized society. Seven 
decades later, Berle and Means’s prophecy rings true. The rapid economic, 
social, and technological changes of the 20th century have led to the emer- 
gence of large corporate bureaucracies. As national governments amass 
political power, multinational corporations dominate the global economy, 
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“over which . . . centralized national governments have less and less control” 
(Genovese 1997, 202). 
Surprisingly, in the collective imagination of corporate law scholars, The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property, which remains one of the most cited 
works in recent decades (Bratton 2001,738), is remembered not as the book 
that called attention to corporate power, but as the book that called attention 
to the separation of ownership from control in large public corporations.’ 
Legal scholars turn to the book’s exegesis of the phenomenon of the separa- 
tion of ownership from control to justify the shareholder-centered vision of 
managerial duties, most famously expressed by Milton Friedman, according to 
which corporate managers are agents of shareholders and must manage the 
corporation in ways that maximize the profits of their principals, to the ex- 
clusion of the interests of other corporate constituencies or the community 
at large (1962, 133-36; 1970). 
How did Berle and Means’s somber comparison between corporate 
power and government power disappear from the scholarly imagination? The 
answer to this question reaches beyond the boundaries of corporate law. As I 
argue in this essay, The Modern Corporation and Private Property was inspired 
by a particular collectivist tradition that immensely influenced the devel- 
opment of American law in the first part of the 20th century, only to be 
replaced by an individualist approach in the years following World War 11. 
So long as this collectivist approach, which I label kgal pluralism,* informed 
analyses of corporate law (and law more broadly), references to The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property emphasized the need to constrain corporate 
1. Most recently, William Bratton explained that the legacy of The Modem Cwporation 
and Private Property has been its rigorous study of the growing separation of ownership from 
control. According to Bratton, the history of the book‘s exegesis of the separation of own- 
ership from control had two stages. In the first 50 years after its publication, the hook was “the 
basis of a paradigm that dominated the field”-it focused on managerial fiduciary duties as a 
solution to the problem of separation of ownership from control. Beginning in the early 1980s, 
however, “the book lost its paradigmatic position along with the general collapse of confi- 
dence in regulatory solutions to economic problems.” Instead of focusing on managerial duties, 
contractarianism-the new paradigm-viewed corporations as nexuses of contractual ar- 
rangements between rational actors, a vision that undermined the need for regulation (2001, 
737). On contractarianism, see E. Weiss 1984; Butler 1989; Columbia Law Review 1989; 
Easterbrook and Fischel 1991; Brudney 1997. 
Nonetheless, according to Bratton, the transformation from managerialism to con- 
tractarianism did not lessen the significance of the book‘s legacy. Despite harsh critiques of 
the book‘s data and of its inaccurate prediction of “ever increasing concentration and disper- 
sion of property,” the book’s exposition of the difficulties associated with the separation of 
ownership from control has remained the focus of corporate scholarship throughout the 20th 
century. Even contractarians have argued that the separation of ownership from control causes 
agency costs to be suboptimally high, and hence jeopardizes contractual self-regulation (754- 
56). On agency costs, see Coffee 1989, 1674-76; 1. Gordon 1989, 1577; Butler and Ribstein 
1990. 
2. In anthropological and sociological studies the term legal pluralism is often used to 
describe the multiplicity of normative centers or institutions in society. In legal studies, the 
federal system is described as committed to the idea of legal pluralism. I use the term in refer- 
ence to corporations, not only because it reflects the mindset of the historical actors discussed 
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power through external mechanisms (like federal regulation). The separation 
of ownership from control was seen through this prism: It allowed corpo- 
rations to amass economic and political power, and it undermined the tra- 
ditional assumption that (individual) self-interest was the best constraint on 
the use of corporate power. Once legal scholars embraced an individualist 
interpretation of corporate law, the rights of individual participants in the 
corporate endeavor-first consumers and workers, but later shareholders- 
became the focus of attention. By the 1980s, mainstream corporate law 
scholars insisted that corporations were to be regulated from within-through 
shareholders’ exercise of their power to vote or, more important, their power 
to sell their shares. In this context, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property became a book about the economic risks (especially to investors) 
triggered by the separation of ownership from control, about the role of the 
free market in ameliorating them, and about the ways in which law should 
imitate the free-market solutions. 
This essay is divided into three parts. The first part explores Berle and 
Means’s vision as they articulated it and as their contemporaries understood 
it. I argue that The Modern Corporation and Private Property embraced a legal 
pluralist vision of the modern state. It rested on the assumption that collec- 
tive institutions like labor unions and corporations were constitutive ele- 
ments of American society and therefore had to be dealt with if the American 
democratic experiment were to continue to succeed. This assumption was first 
explicated by a group of political theorists known as political pluralists. Legal 
pluralists added a dimension of power to theories of political pluralism. They 
called attention to the fact that collective institutions were not only con- 
stitutive elements of the modern state, but also centers of political and eco- 
nomic power equivalent to the power of the state. Indeed, legal pluralists 
argued that the rapid growth of collective institutions challenged the liberal 
assumption that power was embedded in the state. They sought to  articulate 
legal doctrine to allow collective institutions to exercise their (public) power, 
while limiting potential excesses and abuses of power.3 
In short, for Berle and Means the important message of the book was 
a political argument about the allocation of power in society, particularly 
in this essay, but also because I believe that we ought to think about corporations as norm- 
creating and norm-enforcing institutions. While the corporation’s power to enforce its rule is 
different from the power of the sovereign state to do so, the corporation’s economic, social, 
and cultural impact has become so pervasive in modem society so as to make corporate power, 
in effect, comparahle to the coercive power of the state. 
3. This early-20th-century pluralist vision shared with the more well-known postwar plu- 
ralism assumptions about the dispersal of power among diverse groups. Yet, while postwar plu- 
ralist theories tended to assume that power could be mediated through neutral political and 
economic markets, early-20th-century pluralists saw group power as equivalent to sovereign 
power, and hence as unchecked by political and economic markets. O n  the similarities and 
differences between early-20th-century theories of political pluralism and postwar pluralism, 
see Eisenberg 1995. On the differences and similarities between political and legal pluralism, 
see Tsuk 2003. 
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the allocation of power between the state and a wide range of collective 
institutions. Accordingly, the separation of ownership from control not only 
enabled large collective institutions to amass coercive power (which could 
not be tamed by self-interest), but also pointed to  means of constraining 
corporate power. Berle and Means argued that just as the breakup of the 
property atom allowed corporations to accumulate and exercise power of the 
magnitude of state power, it also undermined traditional assumptions about 
the protection of property rights and justified subjecting corporations to the 
limitations associated with sovereign power-that is, the requirement that 
their power be exercised to benefit the community at large. The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property thus concluded with Berle and Means’s 
proclamation that the power of large economic organizations, as augmented 
by the separation of ownership and control, should be exercised to satisfy 
the demands of the community. Corporate power was a power in trust for 
society. 
By insisting that the power of collective institutions had to be exercised 
to promote social welfare, Berle and Means drew a balance between decen- 
tralization and centralized planning that many legal pluralists, especially 
those who joined the New Deal administration, found appealing. Within a 
year of its publication date, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
became the economic bible of many New Deal programs, the thrust of 
which was to coordinate the works of large economic organizations through 
administrative agencies. Programs as different as securities regulation, the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, and the National Recovery Administration 
sought to ameliorate the failing (Depression) market by creating cooperative 
programs among business, labor, consumers, and the government. 
But the legal pluralist image of the modem state was short-lived, as was 
Berle and Means’s vision of the corporation. The second part of this essay 
traces how in the course of the 20th century, Berle and Means’s message 
about corporate power and the allocation of power in society, more broadly, 
disappeared from the scholarly imagination. 
I begin by examining how by the 1940s, a wide range of factors helped 
shift the attention of lawyers, legal scholars, and government officials from 
collective entities to the individual as the basis for legal and political 
analysis. Growing critiques of New Deal policies prompted intellectuals to 
turn to the market (and away from the state) as a regulatory mechanism. A t  
the same time, increasing apprehension about the politically contagious 
European totalitarianism turned scholarly attention to individual rights. 
Gradually, a conception of a free market, constrained only by constitutional 
limitations on the power of collective institutions (especially over individ- 
uals), replaced the 1930s administrative, legal pluralist approach as a means 
of regulating corporate power. In this context, too, interest group pluralism 
replaced legal pluralism as the dominant group theory. Using models of equi- 
librium drawn from economics, interest group pluralists sought to create a 
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conception of a neutral political process in which different groups interact, 
compete, or trade ends (Honvitz 1992, 251-58; Tsuk 2003,1905-8). 
In corporate law, the shift from collectivism to individualism was ini- 
tially reflected in a gradual shift from regulatory to constitutional limitations 
on corporate power. The Modern Corporation and Pnvute Property continued to 
be viewed as a book about corporate power, but scholars began to  elaborate 
other ways to constrain such power. Specifically, instead of demanding that 
corporate power be exercised in trust for the community, scholars emphasized 
the need to subject corporate power to the constitutional limitations em- 
bedded in the Bill of Rights. This shift was reflected in Adolf Berle’s own 
writings in the 1950s and 1960s (1952, 1954, 1967a). 
As the third part explicates, ultimately, the scholarly focus on individ- 
ual rights as a means of regulating corporate power helped legitimate a very 
different picture of the modern corporation-one that described corporate 
entities as nexuses of private, contractual relationships. Informed by neo- 
classical economics, advocates of this new theory of the firm emphasized the 
role of economic markets in regulating corporate power. In their hands, the 
scholarly focus on individual rights, in fact entitlements, as a means of con- 
straining corporate power was gradually translated into a shareholder-wealth- 
maximization vision of corporate law. 
First, to accommodate their picture of the corporation, and their de- 
regulatory vision of the state, proponents of the new economic theory of the 
firm sought to refute earlier concerns about corporate power (Bratton 1989a, 
1478-82). With deregulation and free markets in mind, they reread The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property to be a book not about corporate 
power, but about the limited question of the effects of the separation of 
ownership from control on efficiency and profit ma~imizat ion.~ Then, having 
described Berle and Means and their disciples as concerned with efficiency 
rather than power, advocates of the new economic theory of the firm an- 
nounced that the problem, truly, was not a problem. Specifically, they argued 
that investors preferred to remain passive as it allowed them to maximize 
their profits through diversification, that both the controlling group and the 
shareholders shared the same interests (namely, the maximization of profits), 
and that the market (for shares) held the controlling group at bay. Given such 
assumptions (or conclusions), the separation of ownership from control did 
not pose a problem, but rather pointed to the appropriate legal regime: Law 
was assigned the limited role of mimicking private arrangements intended to 
maximize profits (including keeping shareholders passive and self-interested), 
4. Many have described this question of efficiency and profit maximizing under the label 
“agency costs”-that is, the costs involved in “structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of 
contracts among agents with conflicting interests” (Fama and Jensen 1983b, 304). Early law and 
economics scholarship often dismissed the problem of agency costs as corrected by the free 
market, but more recently, law and economics scholars have admitted its endurance and sought 
to devise legal rules that would ameliorate it. 
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and a market ethics fixated on the short-term maximization of shareholders’ 
wealth, the results of which we saw in the coaorate scandals of the early-21st 
century, became legitimated (Mitchell 2001). 
By uncovering the relationship between the rise and fall of a pluralist 
image of the modem state and the transformation of corporate law in the 20th 
century, this essay challenges traditional narratives about corporations and 
the rise of the administrative state. For one thing, it demonstrates that the 
legal image of the modem corporation was not a necessary outcome of rapid 
industrialization or of economic culture that bounded scholars’ imagina t i~n ,~  
but rather the outcome of attempts by legal scholars to promote particular 
ideologies. Progressives sought not only to expose, but also to embrace, mul- 
tiple centers of coercive power. Their corporate law emerged out of a de- 
liberate attempt to analogize, for purposes of regulatory policies, corporate 
authority and responsibility to sovereign powers and liabilities. In tum, cor- 
porate legal scholarship at the turn of the 21st century is dominated (with 
a few exceptions) by an individualist ideology, which often dismisses con- 
cerns about power and the need for regulation. 
Moreover, by using the transformation of corporate law as illustrative 
of the development of American legal thought in the 20th century, this 
essay revives a particular jurisprudential tradition that has thus far been 
ignored-legal pluralism. As I begin to demonstrate, legal pluralism was a 
midway position between the ideologies of decentralization and centraliza- 
tion that sociologists and political scientists have come to associate with the 
rise of the modem welfare state.6 For one thing, legal pluralists assumed that 
corporations could not be efficiently regulated by local or state institutions, 
or by strong national regulation. Instead, pluralists sought to subject large 
economic organizations to the constraints associated with limits on govern- 
mental power. Not only did their approach offer an  alternative for the cen- 
tralized state we have come to associate with the New Deal, it was also 
imprinted upon a variety of legal doctrines. 
By using The Modern Corporation and Private Property as a way to begin 
exploring the legal pluralist image of the state, I hope this essay not only 
offers an alternative way to reconceptualize corporations and the state, but 
also opens up a door for future studies about the different sites of sovereign 
power that characterize our society and how their existence impacts our 
7 
5.  For example, Mark Roe explicated how the separation of ownership from control was 
not a necessary or natural progression of industrialized societies, hut rather a development 
peculiar to American democratic culture (1994). 
6. On nationalization and decentralization as positions in the political debates of the 
early-20th century, see Skowronek 1982; Fraser and Gerstle 1989; Sandel 1998, 21 1-227. 
7. This essay draws on a larger project in which 1 examine the development of theories 
of pluralism in the 20th century, the interdependence of the different meanings attributed to 
pluralism in distinct historical moments, and the relationship between theories of pluralism 
and the emergence of the modem welfare state. For other parts of the narrative, see Tsuk 
2001a, 2001h, 2002a, 2003. 
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understanding of diverse legal rules and doctrines. While we continue to 
determine the boundaries of power between local, state, national, and in- 
ternational governments (under categories such as decentralization, na- 
tionalization, and globalization), we must also critically assess how the 
development of nongovernmental centers of power has often occurred un- 
checked, away from public scrutiny. 
PART I: 1932-THE MODERN CORPORATION, PRIVATE 
PROPERTY, AND THE LEGAL PLURALIST VISION 
OF THE MODERN STATE 
Berle and Means on Corporations, Property, and Power 
In 1962, Berle commented that in 1932, the year that The Modem 
Corporation and Private Property was published, “the book was thought so 
dangerous as to be almost worth suppressing”: “It was in fact first brought 
out by a law-publishing house then affiliated with the Corporation Trust 
Company. Discovering the viper they had nourished in their corporate 
bosom, publication was promptly suspended after a few copies had been 
sold.. . . Shortly after, the book was reissued by Macmillan” (434). 
Writing three decades after the events, Berle explained that the book 
was thought to be “so dangerous” because it challenged the “power system” 
(434). Interestingly, this characteristic also made it very appealing to law- 
yers, economists, historians, and the popular press. In a review, Jerome 
Frank predicted that “this book would perhaps rank with Adam Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations as the first detailed description in admirably clear terms of 
the existence of a new economic epoch” (1933, 989). In a similar manner, 
Charles Beard wrote that “in the time to come this volume might be pro- 
claimed as the most important work bearing on American statecraft be- 
tween the publication of the immortal ‘Federalist’ by Hamilton, Madison 
and Jay and the opening of the year 1933” (B. Berle and Jacobs 1973, 22; 
Hessen 1983, 273). 
The project was conceived in 1927, when Berle obtained a research 
grant from the Social Science Research Council (financed by the Laura 
Spelman Rockefeller Foundation). As the grant required the research to “be 
carried on in connection with some recognized university,” Berle-a young 
New York lawyer, who was known for a series of commentaries on the 
separation of ownership and management in large corporations-joined the 
Columbia Law School faculty (becoming a full professor in 1928, upon 
William Douglas’s resignation). As the grant further stipulated that Berle 
was “to study corporations with an economist,” Berle asked Means-a friend 
and an economics graduate student-to be his collaborator (B. Berle and 
Jacobs 1973, 20-21; Schwarz 1987, 50-52; Bratton 2001, 752-53). Berle 
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and Means then recruited research students in law and in economics to help 
with the detailed statistical and economic study: 
For example, one year was spent by the research law students on 
corporate bonds, each student, or group of students, writing on some 
new problem in that field. Another year was spent on consolidation, 
mergers and dividends, and the last year on the legal phases of cor- 
porate accounting. Thus in a short time there has been assembled a 
mass of data that would take a single economist a lifetime to gather and 
digest. (Kilne 1933, 558) 
The statistical studies, which Means supervised, documented the grow- 
ing dispersion of stock ownership in large corporations and, hence, the rapid 
separation of ownership from control (Means’s contribution was primarily 
in the first chapters, which contained about 40 pages of charts and tables 
[Hessen 1983, 274-751). Berle and Means concluded that the separation of 
ownership from control “produc[ed] a condition where the interests of owner 
and of ultimate manager . . . often . . . diverg[ed], and where many of the 
checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear[ed]” (p. 6). 
Specifically, Berle and Means argued that the divergence between the 
interests of owners and those of the control group severed the tie between 
self-interest and efficiency. In the classical model of market relations, indi- 
viduals owned and controlled the means of production, and competition 
between individual entrepreneurs was presumed to result in efficient distri- 
bution of market sources. Self-interest-“held in check only by competition 
and the conditions of supply and demand”-was seen as “the best guarantee 
of economic efficiency.” The separation of ownership from control in large 
public corporations challenged this assumption. Corporate managers, who 
“own[ed] so insignificant a fraction of the company’s stock,” had no incen- 
tive to increase the corporation’s value. In turn, stockholders, “to whom the 
profits of the corporation went, could not be motivated by those profits to a 
more efficient use of the property, since they [had] surrendered all disposi- 
tion of it to those in control of the enterprise.” Berle and Means concluded 
that, as a consequence, the managerial use of shareholders’ property might be 
both self-interested and inefficient. “It raises for reexamination the question 
of the motive force back of industry, and the ends for which the modem 
corporation can be or will be run,” they wrote (p. 9; Hessen 1983, 276). 
One would be mistaken, however, to assume that for Berle and Means 
(and their contemporaries), the contribution of The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property was its rigorous analysis of the separation of owner- 
ship from control.* Indeed, in 1932, the book’s novelty was its normative 
8. Certainly, Berle and Means were not the first scholars to call attention to the sepa- 
ration of ownership from control in large corporations. Throughout the early decades of the 
20th century, Progressive legal scholars expressed concerns about management’s growing 
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message.’ For Berle and Means, the “separation of control from ownership” 
was troubling not merely because it broke the atom of property, but also, and 
more important, because at the same time that it undermined self-interest as 
a regulatory tool, it “[made] possible tremendous aggregations of property.” 
For one thing, Means’s statistical studies illustrated that some 200 corpo- 
rations, controlled by fewer than 1,800 men, administered over one-third of 
the national wealth (p. 5; Bratton 2001, 752-53). The possibility of mass 
concentration of power augmented the risk of inefficient uses of power, 
which could adversely affect the economy at large.” The power that cor- 
porations could amass and ways to tame it became the book’s underlying 
theme. 
Power was an “elusive concept, for power could rarely be sharply 
segregated or clearly defined” (p. 69). As Scott Bowman explained, Berle 
(and Means) described two dimensions of power: an  internal dimension and 
an external one (1996, 207). The internal dimension focused on the power 
of corporations over individuals within them, specifically power over em- 
ployment decisions: “[Tlhe relation of the corporation to its workers, its 
plant organization and its technical problem of production” (p. 7). The ex- 
ternal dimension emphasized corporations’ impact on society at large, spe- 
cifically corporations’ power to control markets by administering prices, their 
capacity to accumulate capital and affect the economy, and their ability to 
shape the forces of production through the development of new technology 
(p. 7; Bowman 1996,207-8). Both dimensions of power underlay Berle and 
power and shareholders’ inability to control it. In a 1910 address, Woodrow Wilson noted the 
relatively weak position of stockholders, especially in comparison to the power of those in 
control. According to Wilson, shareholders did not enjoy any of the rights associated with 
property in connection with their corporate stock; they merely contributed money to a busi- 
ness, which other men managed and controlled (434; Frank 1933, 990). In 1923, Thorstein 
Vehlen explored the development of the modem corporate structure, arguing that “absentee 
ownership [had] come to he the main and immediate controlling interest in the life of 
civilized men” (3). In 1925, Thomas Carver pointed out the increasing dispersal of corporate 
securities (Isaacs 1933, 463). In 1927, William Ripley argued that shareholders in publicly 
held corporations had become powerless (78-99; Hessen 1983, 279; Stigler and Friedland 
1983, 241). And in 1931, Maurice Wormser described the corporation as “Frankenstein’s 
creature [which] had developed into a deadly menace to his creator” (Isaacs 1933, 464). 
9. Jerome Frank, for example, described the book as the “[flirst detailed description [of] 
a new economic epoch,” during which corporate rulers had become “princes who . . . are 
sovereigns subject to no effective legal checks.” Following Berle and Means, Frank con- 
cluded that such transformation raised important questions as to the appropriate restraints 
on corporate power (1933, 989-96). In a similar manner, lsaacs emphasized Berle and 
Means’s attention to the social consequences of the separation of ownership from control 
(1933, 464). 
10. Because Berle and Means’s argument focused on publicly held corporations (which 
Berle labeled quasi-puhlic), they viewed the consolidation of power and the separation of 
ownership from control as interrelated phenomena. As they put it: “The Fords and the 
Mellons, whose personal wealth is sufficient to finance great enterprises, are so few, that they 
only emphasize the dependence of the large enterprise on the wealth of more than the 
individual or group of individuals who may he in control” (p. 5) .  O n  Berle and Means’s failure 
to separate the two phenomena, see McCraw 1990, 584. 
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Means’s proclamation that the corporation’s economic power resem- 
bled the power of the sovereign state; hence, it could not be curbed by the 
state. 
Having called attention to corporate power, as augmented by the 
separation of ownership from control, Berle and Means began to formulate a 
unified theme for the law of corporations. They evaluated three ways to 
guarantee responsible exercises of power. The first way-the application of 
strict property rules to passive ownership-would have required the con- 
trol group to exercise corporate power for the “sole benefit of the security 
owners.” Berle and Means feared that such rules would have “the bulk of 
American industry . . . operated by trustees for the sole benefit of inactive 
and irresponsible security owners.” The second way-application of strict 
contractual rules-would have invested in the control group uncurbed 
powers and seen security holders as having “agreed in advance to any losses 
which they might suffer by reason of such use.” Berle and Means believed 
that such rules would create “a corporate oligarchy coupled with the 
probability of an era of corporate plundering.” Rather than choosing tra- 
ditional rules of property or contracts as the underlying theme of the 
modem law of corporations, Berle and Means settled on a third alternative; 
it “offer[ed] a wholly new concept of corporate activity” (pp. 354-56). 
Specifically, Berle and Means argued that shareholders, “by surren- 
dering control and responsibility over the active property, [had] surrendered 
the right that the corporation should be operated in their sole interest,- 
they [had] released the community from the obligation to protect them to the 
full extent implied in the doctrine of strict property rights.” But this tam- 
pering with the interests of the owners did not make the controlling group the 
beneficiary of corporate power. Rather, Berle and Means concluded that if 
the separation of ownership from control was a problem, it also pointed to the 
solution. Specifically, it had “cleared the way for the claims of a group far 
wider than either the owners or the control.” It had “placed the community in 
a position to demand that the modem corporation serve not alone the owners 
or the control [group] but all society” (pp. 355-56): 
11 
Should the corporate leaders, for example, set forth a program com- 
prising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public, 
and stabilization of business, all of which would divert a portion of the 
profits from the owners of passive property, and should the community 
generally accept such a scheme as a logical and human solution of 
industrial difficulties, the interests of passive property owners would have to 
give way. (p. 356, emphasis added) 
11. For more on Berle’s distinction between economic and political power, see Bowman 
1996, 214-17. 
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Simply put, The Modern Corporation and Private Property announced 
that (because ownership was separated from control) publicly held business 
corporations were public trustees. Their power was to be exercised to satisfy 
the demands of the community, however these were to be defined. 
Berle and Means in Context: Legal Pluralism 
Berle and Means’s analysis of corporate power drew upon the Pro- 
gressives’ reconceptualization of property rights as a delegation of coercive 
power to individuals. According to Progressive legal scholars (and their 
followers, the legal realists), the distinction between a supposedly noncoer- 
cive private sphere of individual rights and a coercive public sphere of state 
regulation was fundamentally misguided, because all relations among pri- 
vate parties were premised on the existence and enforcement of the laws of 
contracts and property by the state. Private law was thus a form of regulatory 
public law. Property rights were a means by which the government compelled 
some to yield an income to the owners. And the supposedly self-executing mar- 
ket was a social construct that reflected prevailing judgments as to policy, 
justice, right and wrong, which were often subconscious and inarticu- 
late (Hale 1923; Cohen 1927; Singer 1988, 487-94; Horwitz 1992, 193- 
212; R. Gordon 1995; Alexander 1997,243-302; Tsuk 2002b). In this vein, 
Berle and Means argued that because property-especially corporate prop- 
erty (which did not even resemble traditional property)-was a means by 
which the state legitimated the use of nongovernmental coercive power, the 
state could require those in control of such power to promote public inter- 
ests (Horwitz 1992, 166; Alexander 1997,342-46; Bratton 2001, 760-61). 
Yet the issue at stake was not only one of property rights but also one 
of government. Indeed, by highlighting the relationship between property 
and power, Berle and Means also helped reshape a particular, legal pluralist 
vision of the modern state. The interconnections between legal pluralism 
and The Modern Corporation and Private Property made the book’s legacy an 
enduring one. 
The legal pluralist vision is traceable to theories of political pluralism 
that developed in Britain and the United States amidst the organizational 
revolution of the early-20th century.12 Political pluralists argued that because 
12. The term organizational revolution is used to imply that the rise of large business 
corporations at the turn of the 20th century encouraged other groups to pursue their interests 
through collective action, bureaucratic structures, and administrative expertise. As Ellis 
Hawley pointed out, “the land that had idealized yeoman farmers and rugged individualists 
was becoming a land of corporate organization, bureaucratic systematizers, and associational 
activities” (1979,9). While the term organizational revolution refers to American society in the 
early-20th century, groups and associations had always played an important role in American 
life. The classic account of the role of associations in the antebellum era remains Tocqueville 
183540. For more recent accounts, see Novak 1996; O’Melinn 2000. 
190 LAW &a SOCIAL INQUIRY 
individuals organized into groups to pursue their interests, groups and orga- 
nizations were centers of participation and representation. They main- 
tained that by exploring the role of groups in society, they could offer a more 
realistic description of liberal democratic politics and of the (limited) role of 
the liberal state (Bentley 1908, 465-80; Latham 1952, 12-13). Further- 
more, for many political pluralists, making groups and collective institu- 
tions the basis for political and social analysis was not only a means of 
achieving a more accurate description of American society at the turn of the 
20th century, but also a normative vision. For them, the state, taken as 
a whole, was too broad and abstract a body to command loyalty and alle- 
giance from individuals, who associated more easily with diverse groups and 
organizations than with a unified state entity. They not only recognized the 
existence of a multiplicity of centers of self-government in society, but also 
endorsed this multiplicity as a constitutive element of American democracy. 
They encouraged the growth of associations to  facilitate the flourish- 
ing of valuable forms of identities, ways of life, experiences, and viewpoints, 
all of which were necessary to enable individuals to live rich and meaningful 
lives (Laski 1917; Follett 1918; Dewey 1927).13 
While they encouraged the growth of collective institutions, pluralists 
were also very concerned about the power that collective institutions could 
amass. In fact, potential abuses and excesses of power were the core of the 
pluralist dilemma-that is, the need to determine the normative limits of a 
commitment to pluralism. On the one hand, political pluralists recognized 
the significant role of associations, such as churches, political parties, neigh- 
borhood groups, corporations, and trade unions in an industrialized society, 
either as promoters of individual autonomy and protectors of individuals 
against an otherwise omnipotent state or as economic bases for democracy. 
Such assumptions supported deference to group authorities. To  allow the 
state to exercise power over diverse groups risked imposing one set of con- 
cededly partial interests and beliefs in the name of a general public good. 
O n  the other hand, large organizations, such as corporations, could amass 
13. For example, Harold Laski announced that “the pluralistic theory of the State . . . 
insists that the State, like every other association, shall prove itself by what it achieves . . . 
[and] sets group competing against group in a ceaseless striving of progressive expansion” 
(1917, 23). In a similar manner, Mary Parker Follett-an active social worker and freelance 
writer, whose work on democracy has more recently begun to receive growing recognition- 
argued that “[glroup organization is to be the new method in politics, the basis of our future 
industrial system, the foundation of international order . . . for creative force comes from the 
group, creative power is evolved through the activity of the group life.” “The new and true 
democracy,” Follett explained, “was to be built from small neighborhood groups, to com- 
munity groups, to state groups, to national group, and eventually to an international group 
‘will’ ” (1918,3 quoted in Wren 1987, 257-58). And John Dewey echoed Follett’s argument 
by proclaiming that “democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. I t  is 
the idea of community life itself” (1927, 148). For a historical and political analysis of 
American theories of pluralism, see Eisenberg 1995. For an examination of British theories of 
political pluralism, see Hirst 1989. 
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great economic, political, and social power. Like the sovereign state, these 
organizations could threaten the rights of individuals subject to their power. 
Such assumptions seemed to justify normative intervention in the internal 
governance structures of corporations and other collective institutions, 
government intervention being seen as enhancing individual autonomy 
(Stewart 1987, 373; Ernst 1993, 60). 
Some political pluralists assumed that corporations would remain rel- 
atively small, never amassing the power of the nation-state. For example, 
in his early works, Harold Laski, a British political theorist, uncritically 
adopted Louis Brandeis’s claim that large business units would be “physically 
incapable of successful administration,” and therefore that business corpo- 
rations were “naturally limited in scope.” Given such assumptions, Laski’s 
early pluralist ideal justified liberating corporate management “from all 
restrictions imposed by a higher authority, whether that higher authority be 
the State, the shareholders or management’s own recognition of sacred 
order.” Laski genuinely believed that the “corporation, being a real entity, 
with a personality that is self-created and not state-created must bear the 
responsibility for its actions.” Yet he neglected to assess to whom corporate 
responsibilities extended, or who would keep corporations in check (1916; 
Friedlander 1996, 89-94). “Having pointed to ‘interests,’ ” R. Jeffrey Lustig 
has charged, pluralists “failed to analyze empirically how those interests 
were structured in particular configurations”( 1982, 142-43).14 
A different political pluralist solution focused on the relationship be- 
tween management and workers in corporations. For example, Mary Parker 
Follett, an  American political theorist, advocated the organization of work 
to assure that the experience of workers would be integrated with the expe- 
rience of the expert controlling the plant. Industrial democracy, she wrote, 
would emerge out of the integrative experience of labor and management 
(1924). Follett urged management to exercise power with workers, not over 
them (1925); she envisioned management and labor working together to  
solve conflicts in an “integrative” way-by accommodating the demands of 
all parties involved through cooperation rather than competition (Graham 
1995, 21-24).15 
14. Influenced by his interactions with American scholars, especially Morris Raphael 
Cohen, who admonished the pluralists’ deference to corporate authorities, Laski altered his 
initial position, turning to solutions that resembled those advocated by legal pluralists (1918, 
1925). On Laski’s later renunciation of the analogy between individual personality and the 
personality of associations, see Schneiderman 1998, 532-33. 
15 .  lmmersed in Boston’s social welfare projects, in particular Boston’s public schools, 
Follett lectured on different occasions, publicizing her particular interpretation of industrial 
democracy. She worked with the Placement Bureau and the Vocational Guidance Bureau in 
Boston and was ii member of the Massachusetts Minimum Wage Board. Follett was also a 
conference leader of the Bureau of Personnel Administration in New York (Metcalf and 
Unvick 1942). 
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While political pluralists trusted corporate size, workers, or managerial 
statesmanship to constrain corporate power (Lustig 1982, 114-15; Barenberg 
1993, 1422-23), it remained the task of legal pluralists to articulate laws and 
policies that would embrace corporate power while simultaneously taming its 
potential abuses. By the 1920s, they helped shift the focus of debates about 
pluralism away from identity and self-govemance as the centerpieces of the 
modem state to the potentials and risks of group power. 
In this vein, Berle and Means embraced corporations as constitu- 
tive elements of the modem industrial society (McCraw 1990, 582), and 
analyzed them not only as private business enterprises, but also as social 
and political institutions, involving “the interrelation of a wide diversity 
of economic interests,-those of the ‘owners’ who supply capital, those of 
the workers who ‘create,’ those of the consumers who give value to the 
products of enterprise, and above all those of the control who wield 
power” (pp. 352-53). But in this vein, too, Berle and Means also viewed 
corporations-with their multiplicity of owners, financial complexity, 
managerial control, and immortality-as centers of real, potentially coercive 
power in society. Corporate structure resembled government structure. 
Corporate financial capacities resembled sovereign economic powers. Like 
government authorities, corporate managers exercised power by means 
of a rationalized system of control and administration. Like the sovereign 
state, large corporations formulated laws and policies affecting individuals 
and groups. Like states, corporations were social, economic, and political 
entities. 
Given the similarities between the corporation and the state, Berle 
and Means wanted to focus intellectual attention on corporate power. They 
argued that the separation of ownership from control allowed tremendous 
buildups of power, and that given corporations’ economic power, it was 
meaningless to assume that corporations were private associations, or that 
the state was the only center of coercive (public) power. Accordingly, cor- 
porations were not private contractual arrangements, as liberal legal theory 
sought to describe them, but rather law-making and law-applying entities- 
centers of coercive economic power, which was “comparable to the con- 
centration of religious power in the medieval church or of political power 
in the national state” (p. 352). “A Machiavelli writing today would have 
very little interest in princes, and every interest in the Standard Oil Com- 
pany of Indiana,” Berle and Means proclaimed shortly before the publica- 
tion of The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1930, 71). 
Because they celebrated the contributions of corporate power to the 
modem industrial society, Berle and Means feared that an overuse of gov- 
ernment regulation could eliminate potential benefits of corporate power. 
Like other pluralists, they realized the need to encourage the develop- 
ment of diverse collective institutions to promote various experiences and 
actions. Because they feared potential abuses of corporate power, they 
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also rejected the idea of freeing corporations to act as if they were mere 
aggregates of individuals or real entities, distinct from their individual 
members.I6 They rejected both the early pluralists’ scheme of self-governing 
 association^,'^ and the alternative of allowing the state to regulate all cor- 
porate activities. 
Instead, Berle and Means drew on the reconceptualization of sover- 
eignty as distributive rather than collective and sought to subject large eco- 
nomic organizations to limits associated with checks on government power, 
specifically the requirement that corporations act to benefit the commu- 
nity.” Large corporations, they wrote, were best conceptualized as “the 
organized activity of vast bodies of individuals, workers, consumers and sup- 
pliers of capital under the leadership of the dictators of industry, ‘control’” 
(p. 349). It was thus conceivable, if not essential, that “the ‘control’ of the 
great corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, bal- 
ancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning 
to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather 
than private cupidity” (p. 356). 
16. For most of the 19th century, corporations were viewed as artificial entities, created 
by a charter or a grant of the state. By the late-19th century, however, the fiction paradigm 
lost much of its credibility as states encouraged incorporation in their territories by reducing 
the requirement for a state charter into a mere formality. To accommodate the change, legal 
thinkers adopted either a contractual vision or a natural entity one. The contractual paradigm 
described corporations as mere associations of individuals, similar to partnerships. In turn, the 
natural or real entity paradigm portrayed corporations as distinct from their individual 
members, though like them they had a real existence. Ultimately, the natural/real entity 
vision won over corporate legal theory. In part, its success was due to the inability of the 
contractual paradigm to accommodate the dramatic changes in business structure at the turn 
of the 20th century. Specifically, the contractual paradigm seemed to ignore the recognized 
truth that ownership in large public corporations was rapidly separated from control; in other 
words, as individual corporators were not responsible for corporate actions, corporations could 
not be descrihed merely as aggregations of shareholders’ property. Indeed, even those who did 
not envision the corporation as a natural entity described its existence as real. They used the 
real entity paradigm pragmatically-it was becoming an accurate description of corporate 
reality, with its inultiplicity of ownership, complex financial structure, managerial control, 
and immortality. When Berle and Means turned to study corporations, the debate was thus 
settled: corporations were real entities. For more on the different visions of the corporation, 
see Mark 1987; Hager 1989; Millon 1990; Honvitz 1992, 65-107; Tsuk 2003, 1870-75. 
17. Compare, for example, Berle’s early works to The Modern Curpmation and Private 
Property. In his first book, Studies in the Law of Corporations Finance (1928), Berle expressed 
views similar to those of political pluralists, suggesting that corporate power could be medi- 
ated through voluntary arrangements. Berle’s analysis focused on three safeguards for inves- 
tors: “An association of interested investment bankers, stock exchange regulation of markets, 
and the organized market power of institutional stockholders whose interests coincided with 
individual stockholders” (Schwarz 1987, 53; Berle 1928, 4-40). Faced with Means’s statistical 
exploration of the rapid concentration of economic power, Berle’s focus shifted from groups 
to group power as the basis for legal and political analysis. 
18. It is important to stress the difference between the view that corporate power was 
analogous to sovereign power and the older, artificial vision of corporations as created by 
charters from the state. By analogizing corporate power to sovereign power, legal pluralists 
sought to emphasize that unchecked organizational power could compete with, if not su- 
persede, the sovereign state. 
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Berle and Means concluded that in the exercise of their power, cor- 
porations should be required to consider all interests and act to satisfy the 
needs of the community at  large (though, as I argue below, Berle seemed to 
have been conflicted on the subject). They moved away from traditional, 
abstract distinctions between public and private entities, and in their place 
made power (sovereign, nongovernmental, coercive) the category of legal 
analysis. Berle and Means further argued that uses of corporate power should 
be subject to judicial scrutiny. Courts, accordingly, were to guarantee that 
corporations exercised their power in trust for the benefit of the community. 
Neither the shareholders nor the controlling group could deny this funda- 
mental duty (pp. 274-75; Chayes 1960, 31; Bratton 2001, 765-66). Cor- 
porations were free to exercise their power-in trust, under the watch of 
law. 
Such was the legal pluralist message of The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property. Its focus was corporate power. The separation of ownership 
from control was important to the extent that it contributed to the amassing 
of corporate power and pointed to ways to tame potential excesses and abuses 
of corporate power. Berle and Means did not fully work out the details of 
their scheme. They did not elaborate what the trust responsibilities of cor- 
porations toward the community were. Nor did they explicate how courts 
would avoid imposing on various organizations and associations one set of 
beliefs endorsed by the sovereign state or how courts would formulate laws 
that would accommodate multiple viewpoints and experiences.*’ In any 
event, as the following part explains, within a short decade after the publi- 
cation of The Modern Corgoration and Private Property, different social, po- 
litical, and intellectual trends gradually eroded the legal pluralist image of 
the state and, ultimately, Berle and Means’s important message. 
19 
19. While Berle and Means’s turn to the judiciary might seem awkward given the New 
Dealers’ general preference for administrative agencies over courts, it was nonetheless typical 
of Progressive corporate law writings, intended to provide flexibility in the assessment of com- 
munity interests and the role of the corporation. For more on Progressive corporate law and 
the judiciary, see Bratton 2001. 
20. In retrospect, Berle and Means’s solution might seem as a rather monistic (anti- 
pluralistic) approach: The sovereign state, through its courts, was to impose its values on 
diverse associations. Accordingly, Berle and Means, who had described society as composed of 
multiple sovereigns, normatively gave in to monism and subjected all (sovereign) associations 
and organizations to the absolute sovereignty of the state. It is important to remember, 
however, that Berle and Means also believed that the sovereign state was required to exercise 
its power to promote the public good. In this context, Berle and Means’s analogy between 
sovereign states and corporations and their assignment to the courts-and the rule of law- 
the role of determining appropriate exercises of power by various associations and orga- 
nizations (including the state) supported pluralism. Indeed, trusting the courts to develop 
legal doctrines to facilitate pluralism-rather than imposing on all corporations monolithic 
rules and requirements-seemed to he a perfect way out of the pluralist dilemma. It sought a 
balance-not a choice-between the polarities of group self-government and absolute sov- 
ereignty, between the demands of conservative individualism and radical collectivism. For 
more on this dilemma, see Ernst 1993. 
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PART 11: 1930s-1960s-THE LEGAL PLURALIST VISION 
OF THE MODERN STATE, ECLIPSED 
From a New Deal to World War 
Berle and Means’s conception of self-governing corporations cele- 
brated a diversity of economic activities and experiences. Yet by insisting 
that corporate power had to be exercised to promote social welfare, as de- 
fined by the courts, Berle and Means rejected a nonjudgmental, free-market 
attitude toward economic and political diversity. They offered a particular 
way out of the pluralist dilemma, drawing a balance between decentraliza- 
tion and centralized planning that many legal pluralists turned New Dealers 
found appealing. Specifically, by suggesting that power was and should be 
distributed among a wide range of collective institutions, which, in turn, 
were to be regulated by the courts’ definition of the common good, Berle 
and Means moved beyond both Brandeis’s attack on bigness and calls (such 
as Herbert Croly’s) to nationalize the economy. They sought to  balance 
decentralization with national planning, to re-create the decentralized com- 
munities in which Americans had traditionally exercised self-government 
while encouraging Americans to endorse a new, pluralistic understanding of 
their national identity. 
Not all those who viewed groups as the bases of the modem state ac- 
cepted the corporate model as the ultimate model for reform. Many political 
pluralists adopted a traditional, contractual, vision of groups and associa- 
tions, as did many supporters of labor organization. They preferred to view 
labor unions as voluntary trade agreements meant to  achieve better wages, 
hours, and working conditions and protected under the First and Thirteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution (Pope 2002). Still, by the time the New 
Deal administration came into power, the legal pluralists’ collectivist ap- 
proach and the labor organizers’ contractual approach converged on viewing 
the collaboration among associations and collective entities under a national 
umbrella as a way out of the Depression. Groups and associations could pro- 
tect individuals from the uncertainties of the market, while insuring against 
disasters that could sweep through a national economy. 
Such hopes informed many New Deal programs. The Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 rested on the assumption 
that government planning required cooperation with big business, and that 
mandatory transparency and disclosure had to underlie such cooperation.*’ 
~ ~~ 
21. Already in The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle and Means wrote that 
“the securities [were] useful as a basis of credit or exchange throughout the country . . . [and 
of] . . . information” (p. 299). Then, in The Nature ofDificulty (written for members of Franklin 
Roosevelt’s “hrain trust”), Berle reiterated his conclusions in The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, urging the establishment of “a Capital Issues Board which could perform the 
functions of a federal Blue Sky Commission, exacting full information about securities sold.” 
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In a similar manner, the Tennessee Valley Authority, created in 1933, 
sought to combine government planning with a decentralized, regional 
bureaucracy. I t  offered a means of cultivating small, integrated communities 
where workers would remain attached to the land while gaining access to 
electricity, transportation, and technology. And, while according to some 
commentators, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 erred on the 
side of extreme national planning, it, too, was rooted in the understanding 
that collective entities such as corporations and labor unions played an  
important role in the modem economy. The NIRA established the Na- 
tional Recovery Administration (which the U.S. Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional in 1935) to oversee cooperative programs among business, 
labor, and government (specifically to negotiate agreements with employers 
regarding working conditions and collective bargaining) (Sandel 1998,252- 
55). Not surprisingly, within a year after its publication, Time magazine la- 
beled The Modern Corporation and Private Property “the economic Bible of 
the Roosevelt administration” (Hovenkamp 1988, 1685). 
These programs were adopted during the first phase of the New Deal. 
Their main focus was bringing relief and recovery through government 
planning and coordination (Weiner 1952, 724-25). They were grounded in 
the realization that, as Louis Jaffe put it, “the most significant and powerful 
components of the social structure [were] economic groups, competing and 
complementary in varying degrees” (1937, 201); their thrust, as Means 
described it, was not to “make the market effective as a coordinator,” which 
would have required “revers[ing] the trend of a century and break[ing] the 
large units into a multitude of smaller enterprises.” Rather, the thrust of the 
early New Deal was to keep the large units and increase “the element of 
administrative coordination of economic activity rather than its elimina- 
tion” (1935, 63). 
Focused, as they were, on the collaboration between government and 
business, the early New Deal programs were informed by the legal pluralism 
of Berle and Means. Gradually, however, and especially after the unantic- 
ipated economic recession of 1937, New Dealers began to reassess their 
vision of the modem administrative state. 
Some New Dealers advocated the expansion of the regulatory state. 
Many of them were consistently opposed to the idea of an associational 
economy (or pluralism), and the failure of the NRA to provide sufficient re- 
lief to the sick economy only exacerbated their belief that the attempt to 
create a “‘business commonwealth’ capable of ordering its own affairs . . . had 
produced only increased concentrations of power and artificially inflated 
prices.’’ They rejected the pluralists’ belief in a harmonious industrial society 
Berle hoped that such a commission would develop “to the point where it would exercise a real 
control over undue expansion of groups of credit instruments, where issue of these reached a 
point threatening the safety of the financial structure” (B. Berle and Jacobs 1973, 47). 
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composed of multiple parts, organically tied together, and functioning with 
limited state interference, and instead argued that conflict and instability 
were inevitable in the modern economy. To alleviate these modern traits, 
they called on the federal government to “step into the market to protect the 
interests of the public.” These New Dealers did not call for decentralization 
of economic power or stricter antitrust oversight. Rather, they wanted to ex- 
pand the regulatory functions of the administrative state to defend the con- 
sumer and promote full production (Brinkley 1989, 87-94). 
Protecting consumers and increasing mass purchasing power was also 
the focus of a second group of New Dealers who endorsed not a regulatory 
vision of the modern state but a compensatory one. For them, the plural- 
ity of large economic entities was both a real and a positive development. 
Hence, they wanted to guarantee that the state did not intervene in the ac- 
tivities of collective institutions. For them, the state’s role was not to co- 
ordinate economic activity but to redress “weaknesses and imbalances in the 
private economy without directly confronting the internal workings of cap- 
italism.” The state was to “manage the economy without managing the in- 
stitutions of the economy.’’ As President Franklin Roosevelt pointedly put 
it, the government’s role was to spend capital “to increase [the] public 
wealth and to build up the health and strength of the people,” in order “to 
help [the] system of private enterprise to function” (Brinkley 1989, 94-97). 
With totalitarianism in Europe, and scholars’ growing concerns about 
the relationship between statism and tyranny (Brinkley 1995, 154-65), the 
compensatory, fiscal vision of the state, which invested only limited power 
in the state, became the more appealing one. At the same time, the eco- 
nomic boom produced by the war efforts made the need for regulation less 
urgent. The economy seemed to do well without government interference. 
A vision of a free market, compensated by the state’s fiscal hand on rare 
occasions, began to dominate economic thought (Brinkley 1989, 97-12 1; 
Sandel 1998, 250-73). It was a swift revolution. Rapidly, large corporations 
took over government responsibilities. Writing in 1952, Berle noted that 
“[aln immensely important area of American industrial and financial econ- 
omy is administered in each field by ‘concentrates,’ composed of not more 
than five or six large corporations in each identifiable field” (641). 
The corporation, however, had changed. By the end of the New Deal, as 
Herbert Hovenkamp wrote, “[llittle was left of the classical corporation”: 
The federal securities acts regulated its relationship with shareholders and 
creditors, federal labor laws regulated its dealings with workers, while anti- 
trust laws and the Federal Trade Commission regulated the corporation’s re- 
lationship to consumers and suppliers ( 1988, 1688-89). Such transformations 
gave the corporation a legal appearance that was very different from the pow- 
erful entity described in The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 
Indeed, while changes in corporate structure during the first half of 
the 20th century helped augment the power and discretion of corporate 
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management, the New Deal regulatory tools helped obscure the economic 
(and political) risks associated with such power. In the aftermath of World 
War 11, the lessening of concerns about corporate power converged with a 
growing uneasiness about the collectivist vision that legal pluralists em- 
braced in the early-20th century to produce a new image of the state and of 
the corporation. As the following sections expiain, this vision put, first, 
individual rights and, then, individual entitlements at the center of legal, 
political, and economic analyses. Gradually, the early-20th-century pluralist 
vision that Berle and Means brought to bear upon corporate law was erased 
out of the scholarly imagination. 
The Individualist Turn 
Beginning in the late 1930s, different trends and developments helped 
shift the attention of American scholars away from collective institutions 
and toward the individual as the basis for legal and political analysis. 
First among these developments was the wide acceptance of Keynesian 
economics beginning in the late 1930s and continuing until the mid-1970s. 
I t  provided economic justification for the later New Deal fiscal policies, 
which sought to regulate the economy not through planning but by “ac- 
cepting existing consumer preferences” and “manipulating aggregate de- 
mand.” As Michael Sandel recently explained, Keynesian economics was 
predicated upon the belief that governments should not choose among com- 
peting individual visions of the public good. Its celebration both reflected 
this image-the image of the night-watchman state-and helped deepen its 
hold on American public life. The individual consumer became the foun- 
dation of economic thought (1998, 251-62). 
The individual was also at the core of a new pluralist image of the 
modem state, which political theorists, especially Robert Dahl, articulated 
in the postwar years. While informed by the early pluralists, Dahl and his 
colleagues reduced collective entities into individual arrangements (viewing 
collective institutions as allowing individuals more effectively to socialize 
and to pursue their ends). Drawing upon models of equilibrium derived from 
economics, their pluralist image of the state rested on the assumption that 
individuals formed multiple interest groups that interacted, competed, and 
traded ends in neutral economic and political markets (1956, 1967). To- 
gether these neopluralists turned the American state into a political compro- 
mise between diverse pressure groups and entrusted presumably free political 
markets to produce shared public goods (Purcell 1973, 253-66).** 
22. On different strands of postwar interest group pluralism, see Eisenberg 1995; Schiller 
1999. 5-18. 
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The neopluralist image of the state was traceable to “a loss of faith in 
the ideals of laissez-faire capitalism,” specifically the idea “that self-interest 
pursued in economic transactions would inure to the common good.” Yet, 
ironically, neopluralists embraced a similar faith in the structure of political 
markets and political bargains. Accordingly, the public interest would result 
from “the unregulated pursuit of private interests in the legislatures” (Balkin 
1990, 388-91). 
Indeed, proponents of both Keynesian economics and interest-group 
politics hoped to create “a social order that was neither intrusive nor anar- 
chistic, that provided opportunities for cooperative action and crevices for 
personal freedom” (Pells 1989, 143-44). John Kenneth Galbraith described 
the countervailing demands of different economic interests (producers, labor 
unions, consumers) as the fuel that made American capitalism work (1952, 
115-39). And Daniel Bell noted that “[tlhe growing complexity of society 
necessarily multiplie[d] . . . interests, regional or functional, and in an open 
society the political arena . . . [was] a place where different interests [fought] 
it out for advantage” (1960, 60). In short, postwar intellectuals viewed in- 
terest groups, organized along economic or political axes, as ensuring social, 
political, and economic stability (Glasberg and Schwartz 1983, 325). 
Keynesian economics and the neopluralist vision of the state emphasized 
the role of the individual (consumer or group member), but they also retained 
a role for the group in economic and political analysis. Indeed, it was another 
strand of legal thought, emerging out of the same intellectual milieu, which 
had a more critical effect on legal pluralism’s demise. Beginning in the late 
1930s, constitutional law scholars made individual rights the focus of legal 
analysis. The New Deal administration endorsed an early-20th-century civil 
rights discourse, which emphasized the rights of individuals to work, to live- 
lihood, to social insurance, and to economic independence. This vision of 
rights was compatible with collective rights. Beginning in the late 1930s, 
however, constitutional law scholars shifted attention from the rights of 
collective institutions such as labor unions to the rights of ethnic and racial 
minorities. Gradually, they helped shape a different discourse of rights- 
namely, the right of the individual to be different (Forbath 2000, 698-99). 
The new discourse of rights was nurtured by growing apprehension 
about the politically contagious European totalitarianism, increased African 
American organization and protest (among other issues, against labor unions’ 
discriminatory practices), fears of Japanese propaganda directed at African 
Americans, and concerns about overzealous patriotism that during World 
War I manifested itself in encroachments upon civil liberties. Amidst anxiety 
about the possibility that totalitarianism would reach American shores, the 
issue of ethnic and racial equality eclipsed concerns about economic and 
social rights. Despite the strong correlation between racial discrimination 
and economic inequality, and the combined ascendance during the 1940s of 
both racial and labor-related rights, the concept of liberty became associated 
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with the right not to suffer racial and ethnic discrimination and the concept 
of social and economic citizenship gradually lost its primacy (Forbath 2000, 
707-8; Dudziak 2001; Goluboff 2001). 
The shift from social and economic rights to  racial and ethnic dis- 
crimination was paralleled by a change in the perception of the role of the 
three branches of government in protecting civil rights. Specifically, in the 
early-20th century, and most important during the New Deal, legal scholars 
emphasized the role of the executive and legislative branches in promot- 
ing social and economic rights. But with totalitarianism in Europe, as legal 
scholars became increasingly concerned about the relationship between stat- 
ism and tyranny, they sought to limit governmental power. While neoplu- 
ralists envisioned a passive legislature, merely giving voice to the desires of 
interest groups, scholars emphasizing individual rights sought to limit the 
control of the legislative and executive branches by strengthening the au- 
thority of the Supreme Court to protect individual rights and liberties; the 
Warren Court reflected the culmination of their efforts.23 
It was this intellectual atmosphere-in which economists focused on 
the individual consumer, neopluralists on the individual group member, and 
constitutional law scholars on the right of individuals to be different-that 
led progressive legal thinkers to reject the collectivism (or pluralism) of 
earlier generations. For one thing, concerns about the power of the state 
grew into concerns about the potential power of other collective institu- 
tions, leading legal scholars and political theorists to turn their uninter- 
rupted attention to the defense of individual rights and liberties.24 It is with 
this in mind that we can turn to a major milestone in the development of 
23. In comparison, while they envisioned a passive legislature, neopluralists called for 
judicial restraint. Members of what had become known as the legal process school, including 
Alexander Bickel, Herbert Wechsler, Harry Wellington, Albert Sacks, and Henry Hart, 
maintained that “choices among policy preferences were best left to the politically responsive 
legislature.” In their opinion, the judiciary was not to intervene with policymaking, hut rather 
was required “to determine society’s ‘enduring values’ and to ferret out ‘neutral principles’ 
upon which legislation should be judged.” For example, the judiciary was to guarantee that 
legislative processes would not unfairly exclude certain groups, specifically African Americans 
(Schiller 1999, 13-16). This vision fell into disrepute in the 1960s (Tsuk 2003, 1908). 
24. Powerful critiques pointed to the inequalities of social, political, and economic power 
that permeated American corporations and society. C. Wright Mills, for example, argued that 
in the postwar years, “a conjunction of historical circumstances has led to the rise of an elite 
of power,” whose “decisions carry more consequences for more people than has ever been the 
case in the world history of mankind.” According to Mills, the postwar years witnessed “[tlhe 
top of the American system of power . . . [becoming] much more unified and much more 
powerful, the bottom . . . much more fragmented, and in truth, impotent” (1956, 28-29). 
Mills’s contemporary, Henry Kariel, explicitly placed the blame for this outcome with the in- 
tellectuals’ fascination with pluralism. He charged that American social science had provided 
the framework that allowed organizations to trump individual rights. Kariel advocated placing 
constraints on organizational practices to promote the protection of individual liberties ( 1961 ). 
As Kariel indicated, he would have the United States move “from the much-celebrated ideal of 
Tocqueville toward the still unfashionable one of Rousseau, from a hierarchical public order 
toward an equalitarian one” (4). Sharing similar views, Gabriel Kolko, Mills’s and Kariel’s 
contemporary, reinterpreted the regulatory laws of the Progressive era as reflecting the efforts 
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the modern discourse of rights, and, thus, in the story of legal pluralism’s 
demise-to Charles Reich’s “The New Property” ( 1964). 
“The New Property” was the most important article on the subject of 
property since the realists (Berle and Means among them) challenged the 
classical (natural rights) conception of property. Informed by the Keynesian 
economists’ discussion of the role of the state, by the political theorists’ 
discussion of interest groups, and by the legal scholars’ growing obsession 
with the Bill of Rights, Reich introduced the idea of property as a basic 
entitlement. “[Iln the final analysis,” he wrote: 
. . . the Bill of Rights depends upon the existence of private property. 
Political rights presuppose that individuals and private groups have the 
will and the means to act independently. But so long as individuals are 
motivated largely by self-interest, their well-being must first be inde- 
pendent. Civil liberties must have a basis in property, or bills of rights 
will not preserve them. (1964, 771) 
Reich’s goal was to protect individuals against abuses of government 
power, especially in the allocation of government benefits. He wanted his 
readers to recognize that government largesse-“money, benefits, services, 
contracts, franchises and licenses”-were replacing traditional forms of 
wealth (733). Drawing on the legal realists’ critique of the distinction be- 
tween a public sphere of coercive power and a private sphere of individual 
transactions, Reich attacked the traditional distinction between private, 
prepolitical property rights and public, governmentally created, privileges. 
If, as the realists demonstrated, all property was governmentally created, 
then, Reich proclaimed, the constraints on the allocation of private property 
should be applied to government largesse. Accordingly, the fact that gov- 
ernment benefits were public property could not mean that such benefits 
could be withheld completely. 
By characterizing government largesse as property, Reich hoped to 
establish procedural constraints that would bolster the welfare state while 
strengthening its rule of law character. He was reacting to the abuse of gov- 
ernmental power during the McCarthy era, specifically to denials of ben- 
efits to people accused of communist associations. Viewing “the role of the 
of conservative corporate leaders to maintain the social and political status quo amidst 
changing economic conditions ( 1963, 8). Kolko pointedly proclaimed that the modern 
American state was the result of business efforts to explain capitalism in a way that allowed 
the corporate elite to maximize their profits (3). Kolko further emphasized that “many well- 
intentioned writers and academicians” ended up supporting business goals-not only because 
they naively believed that “[g]overnment economic regulation, per se, was desirable” or 
“assumed that the power of government was neutral and socially beneficent.” but also hecause 
many of them were, in fact, conservative in their intentions, viewing the stability promoted 
bv businesses as the onlv wav to maintain “the basic virtues of canitalism” (286). O n  the role , ,  ~I 
of these intellectuals in discrediting “the group pluralist vision of policy-making,” see Schiller 
1999, 48-52. 
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new property, as well as the old,” as satisfying “individuals’ needs-not 
necessarily their wants-so that they can contribute to the commonwealth 
as independent (Alexander 1997,375), Reich sought to use pro- 
cedural constraints to legitimate the welfare state. In so doing, however, he  
also undermined the conservative undertones of earlier critiques of the 
administrative state, critiques that called for procedural constraints on ad- 
ministrative agencies (Horwitz 1992, 245-46; Alexander 1997, 368-75). 
Reich’s “The New Property” was compatible with the legal pluralist 
vision of the state. Indeed, Reich recognized the significance of collective 
institutions. “Today,” he  commented, “it is the combined power of gov- 
ernment and the corporation that presses against the individual” (1964, 
773). Yet, unlike the pluralists who encouraged collective ownership while 
seeking to limit the power of collective entities, Reich’s postwar critique of 
the public-private distinction used the liberal protection of private property 
to  advocate the creation of individual entitlements in public (or collective) 
property. Instead of emphasizing that corporations were trustees for the 
community, Reich pointed out the need to allocate the benefits created by 
collective institutions (and the government) to individuals. It is thus per- 
haps not surprising that, despite Reich’s goals, his theory was quickly inter- 
preted as advocating the idea that “property is a negative claim that the 
owner has against others, including the state, not to interfere with her use, 
possession, and enjoyment of her property” (Alexander 1997, 373-75). 
A concept of property associated neither with collective ownership nor 
with individual ownership but with entitlements-specifically individual 
entitlements-sat well with a description of liberty as the freedom to pursue 
individual interests away from government regulation. According to the 
libertarians’ vision of the new property, the state’s role was thus not to seek 
to provide individuals with a set of particular goods, but rather to protect 
individuals’ entitlements and expectations. As part 111 of this essay expli- 
cates, in corporate law, stock and the expectancy of profits became such 
entitlements. Before exploring how the shift from pluralism to individualism 
became a shift from concerns about corporate power to concerns about 
shareholders’ property rights, let us turn, first, to the legal pluralists’ (spe- 
cifically to Berle’s) reinterpretation of their collectivist vision in an intel- 
lectual world committed to  individual rights. 
The (Legal) Pluralist Alternative I: Corporations and the Bill of Rights 
For legal pluralists like Berle and Means, the protection of individual 
rights went hand in hand with, indeed complemented, the celebration of 
~~ 
25. In this respect, Reich belonged with the civic republican tradition, which examined 
property ownership as a means of allowing individuals to participate in the public sphere 
(Alexander 1997, 373-77). 
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collective rights. While they did not fully work out the details of the bal- 
ance between collective and individual rights, pluralists sought to  empower 
individuals by recognizing the importance of collective institutions to in- 
dividual freedom and by allowing individuals to come together, to  unite, to 
promote their interests. Potential tensions between the individual and the 
group were mediated, as The Modern Corporation and Private Property illus- 
trated, by constraints on group power. In other words, at the same time that 
pluralists encouraged the growth of collective institutions, they also be- 
lieved they could tame the power that such entities could exercise over 
individuals (and other groups). 
This legal pluralist vision continued to influence legal scholarship in 
the postwar years. For example, Mark DeWolfe Howe, a professor at Harvard 
Law School, emphasized the advantages of extending rights to groups. 
Robert Horn, a political scientist at  Stanford University, encouraged the 
Supreme Court to protect groups “both from government interference and 
from the atomistic tendencies of individuals who claimed rights against a 
group.” And Thomas Cowan, a professor of law at Rutgers University, crit- 
icized American courts for ignoring the fact that “modern life [was] lived 
associatively. The new democracy [was] an aggregation of sub-groups, not 
primarily of individuals.” Indeed, many other postwar legal scholars, follow- 
ing in the tradition of legal pluralism, studied the possible ways in which the 
law could accommodate different groups and promote pluralism (Schiller 
1999, 17). 
Such was Berle’s mindset. Continuing to support government plan- 
ning, but refusing to view corporations as mere aggregations of shareholders 
(or property owners), Berle called attention to the importance of subjecting 
corporations to constitutional limitations as if they were state actors. Spe- 
cifically, Berle proclaimed that in the course of the first half of the 20th 
century, an arrangement had developed to govern corporations’ duties to- 
ward the community. Accordingly, corporations were required to  embrace 
“a degree of minimal protection for individuals dealing within the system 
of a concentrate.” If in The Modern Corporation and Private Property Berle 
envisioned corporations acting as trustees for the community, by 1952 he 
viewed the corporation as “an arm of the state, held to certain of the 
limitations imposed on the state itself by the Bill of Rights requiring 
the concentrate to respect certain individual rights and to assure a measure 
of equal protection of the laws within the scope of its power” (643). Col- 
lective institutions were to “be so handled that they [could] and [did] ac- 
ceptably perform their functions of supply and growth.” But within these 
collectives, “and as an offset to their necessary organization and power, the 
basic rights of individuals [were to] be as scrupulously protected against 
them as they were against the erstwhile political state” (661). 
Berle of 1952 was not different from Berle of 1932. True, in The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, Berle called for a judicial imposition of 
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trust on corporations, while in 1952 his argument focused on constitutional 
constraints. But this was a minor change, and one that reflected not only 
the rapidly growing intellectual attention to the Fourteenth Amendment 
and individual rights, but also, and more important, the impossibility of 
imposing a unified conception of social trusteeship on corporations after the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938) put an 
end to the idea of federal common law (Bratton 2001, 768). 
Such nuances notwithstanding, Berle, twenty years after the publica- 
tion of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, remained a pluralist. 
He believed that corporations were important both for the economy and for 
American society, and just as he wanted to restrict corporate power to ben- 
efit the community, so he thought that corporate power should be limited to 
protect individual rights. Using cases such as Shelky v. Kraemer (1948) and 
Marsh v. Alabama (1946) as examples, Berle concluded that “[ilf, for in- 
stance, a corporation dealing in goods or services essential to the life of an 
individual discriminate[d] against a customer on the ground of race or in a 
matter which invade[d] his Constitutional right of freedom of speech or 
religion, it would seem that there [was] a violation of the guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment” (657-61).26 
Berle’s vision could easily have been embraced by Keynesian econo- 
mists, Reich, and those concerned about individual liberties, but his focus 
was different from theirs. Berle’s was a collectivist interpretation of decisions 
that have since become milestones in the modem history of individual 
rights and liberties. His vision remained grounded in the early. 20th-century 
collectivist understanding of property and in the idea that “[t]he corporation 
[had] been the avenue by which change from the private possessory system of 
the late-18th and the 19th centuries toward the organization system of the 
20th century [had] taken place in the United States” (643). As Berle also 
recognized, the embrace of collectivism gave rise to a dilemma-to the need 
to draw a balance between the rights of corporate members to promote their 
interests through collective action and the rights of individuals outside the 
corporation. He wanted to keep intellectual discussions focused on this plu- 
ralist dilemma, and he saw decisions like Shelky v. Kraemer and Marsh v. 
Alabama as offering ways out of it.27 
26. For earlier arguments in favor of imposing constitutional constraints on corporations, 
see Justice John M. Harlan’s dissenting opinion in the Civil Rights Cases. As William Forbath 
details, such an argument also played a role in the creation of the Fair Employment Practices 
Commission during World War I1 and (failed) attempts in the 1940s to make it permanent 
(2001, 211-15). For a more recent articulation of this argument see Miller 1976. See also 
Phillips 1989. 
27. As Berle put it: 
[tlhe emergence of the concept of protection of individuals, be they suppliers or cus- 
tomers, along with the emerging system of rights of labor and workmen, means in 
substance a system of protection for the individuals constituting all of the groups with 
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Calling attention to the pluralist dilemma and shifting scholarly focus 
from administrative processes to constitutional limitations was Berle’s legal 
pluralist response to the changing trends in American thought. It focused 
on the relationship of the corporation with individuals who came in contact 
with it. Yet, as Berle well recognized, to accommodate the individualist turn 
in legal scholarship, more urgent was the need to articulate a theory of man- 
agerial fiduciary duties that would be predicated upon viewing the corpo- 
ration as an entity rather than as an aggregation of property owners. As the 
following section explains, at stake was the emerging image of the shareholder- 
owned corporation, an image that was foreign to Berle’s thought and to legal 
pluralism more broadly. 
The (Legal) Pluralist Alternative 11: For Whom are Corporate 
Managers Trustees? 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property concluded that corporate 
power was to be exercised in trust for the community; accordingly, corporate 
managers were fiduciaries for the community at large. But, as students of 
managerial fiduciary duties know, the norm underlying the doctrine of fi- 
duciary duties (at least since the famous 1919 case, Dodge v. Ford) has rested 
on the assumption that “[a] business corporation is organized and carried 
on primarily for the profit of the stockholder” (Dodge 684). Berle himself 
seemed to have endorsed this position in a famous debate with E. Merrick 
Dodd of Harvard Law School, a debate that took place “[dluring the pen- 
ultimate stage of The Modern Corporation’s creation” (Schwarz 1987, 64). 
While Dodd asserted that corporate managers were “fiduciaries for the corpo- 
ration and not merely for its individual members, that they [were] . . . trustees 
for an institution rather than attorneys for the stockholders” (1 932, 1160; 
Weiner 1969; Sommer 1991), Berle proclaimed that corporate powers were 
held in trust for the benefit of shareholders (1931, 1049). As Berle pointedly 
put it, the legal system would “best be protecting the interests” it knew-that 
is property interests--“being no less swift to provide for the new interests as 
they successively appear[ed]” ( 1932, 1367).28 
which a great corporation comes into contact. And here perhaps is the deep cleft 
hetween the systems now competing for dominance in the modern, industrialized world. 
. . . T h e  legal structure in our system suhjects the dominant economic organization and 
the holder of the power created by it to limitations for the purpose of protecting 
individuals in their essential freedom. It subjects them to a measure of planning for the 
protection of the community as a whole. (1952, 660) 
28. Already in The Modern Corporation and Private Property certain paragraphs seemed to 
advocate fiduciary duties toward shareholders. As I argued elsewhere, it seems that Means was 
more sympathetic to the interests of the community at large than Berle. T h e  seeming in- 
consistencies in the hook might thus reflect the different assumptions of its two authors (Tsuk 
2003, 1890). For Means’s perspective, see Means 1935, 66. 
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However, in 1954, Berle proclaimed that Dodd had won the debate; 
he concluded that “modern directors [were] not limited to running business 
enterprise for maximum profit, but [were] in fact and recognized in law as 
administrators of a community system” (Berle 1960, xii; 1954, 169). Sur- 
prisingly, there was little evidence to support this argument. As Joseph L. 
Weiner commented, “[tlhe thesis . . . that corporate powers [were] held in 
trust for stockholders could not be established by decisions of the 1920’s, 
but [could] hardly be contradicted [in the 1960~1” (1969, 1466; Israels 1964). 
This was also Dodd’s assessment in 1942, when he wrote that the New Deal 
legislation had made his ideal of managers as trustees for workers, consum- 
ers, and the community irrelevant for corporate law. According to Dodd, 
corporate law became fixated on the relationship between managers and 
shareholders (516-47).*~ 
One might want to attribute Berle’s concession to his ambivalence on 
the subject. Another reason might have been the famous case, A. P. Smith 
Manufacturing Company v.  Barlow (1953), in which the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey upheld a New Jersey statute authorizing corporate charitable con- 
tributions. An appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, in which Berle repre- 
sented the company’s shareholders, was dismissed for the want of a substantial 
federal question. It was then that Berle, maybe even bitterly, conceded to 
Dodd. 
Yet there was more to Berle’s debate with Dodd, his role in Barlow v. 
A. P. Smith Manufacturing Company (1953), and his concession than the 
discussion above suggests. Berle’s positions on the question of fiduciary 
duties in the 1930s and in the 1950s were informed by his legal pluralist 
vision of the state and corporations. As I argue below, the differences in his 
approach had to do with the changing tides of American legal thought- 
with the shift from pluralism to individualism. 
First, it is important to remember that Berle wrote the article that 
instigated his debate with Dodd “in reaction to the apparently unlimited 
powers conferred on corporate management by recently enacted corporation 
statutes and charter provisions” (Weiner 1969,1458). His role in Barlow v .  
A. P. Smith Manufacturing Combany was motivated by similar concerns 
about statutes authorizing charitable contributions by  corporation^.^' 
29. Dodd noted that in the decade that had passed since his debate with Berle, the 
nation turned not to “industrial government, as represented by corporate managers, but to 
political government” to resolve economic tensions. Business obligations toward labor were 
accordingly “accomplished by means other than treating business managers as in some 
measure fiduciaries for their employees.” Such alternative means included statutory rights, 
unionization, and collective bargaining. In a similar manner, Dodd described the idea that 
managers were trustees for consumers or the community as “a misnomer” (1942, 54647) .  
30. Indeed, charitable contributions were an exception in most state statutes. As one 
commentator in the 1950s noted, with the exception of provisions in statutes authorizing 
corporate gifts to charity, the theory of corporate social responsibility, while it “[had] been 
much discussed by philosophers of corporation law, . . . [had] almost no reflection in the actual 
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In the mid-l930s, in light of statutes granting broad discretion to 
corporate management, Berle, the legal pluralist, feared that Dodd’s position 
(extending fiduciary duties to all corporate claimants) would encourage a 
struggle of interest groups and turn the corporation into a battleground, 
with each group-the laborers, the security holders, the consumers-seeking 
“to assert . . . [its] . . , private claims . . . by force or threat-to take what each 
[could] get, just as corporate management” did (Schwarz 1987,65). 
If we were to extend managerial fiduciary duties to other groups, Berle 
concluded in the 1930s, it would be “an invitation not to law and orderly 
government, but to a process of economic civil war” (Schwarz 1987, 65). 
Instead, Berle wanted the courts to protect the rights of shareholders as 
property owners because he saw shareholders’ interests as an approximation 
of community interests (Tsuk 2003, 1891-94). Of the plurality of interests 
involved in corporations, shareholders’ interests were the connecting tissue 
between corporations and the community-a means to a socially desirable 
outcome. To use Mary Parker Follett’s terminology, shareholders’ interests 
were the integrative force, the force that would prevent society from split- 
ting into autonomous centers of power. 
Berle believed that by protecting the property rights of shareholders, 
the courts would be able to tame corporate power in ways that contempo- 
raneous legislation failed to do (Warren 1964, 1383). As Berle explained in 
a 1962 exchange with Henry G. Manne, he did not endorse his position in 
the debate with Dodd because he believed that shareholders had the only 
claim on corporate profits, but rather because 
[he] was afraid of corporate managements as social statesmen, or pos- 
sibly as controlling fund-donors for universities and other philanthro- 
pies, not because [he] objected to the job being done, but because [he] 
thought corporate managements were not especially qualified to do it. 
In doing it they might revert to their classic profit-making function, 
and in that case would do the job badly-or  worse (443). 
In other words, Berle’s view of shareholders’ interests did not focus on 
questions of profits, efficiency, or capital markets. He did not seek to eval- 
uate whether or not shareholders’ profits were maximized. Rather, Berle’s 
understanding of shareholders’ interests was mediated by his conceptuali- 
zation of property rights as delegating sovereign power to the owners. Berle 
believed that property rules could therefore define the boundaries of free- 
dom (of the owners, of the controlling group, and of the corporation as an 
entity). 
statutes” (Katz 1058, 180-81). Having witnessed state legislators eroding all constraints on 
corporate power, it seems that Berle took the appeal in Barlow w .  A. P. Smith Manufacturing 
Company because he wanted a declaration from the courts about corporate power with respect 
to the only issue where it still rnattered+haritahle contrihutions. 
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In this respect, it is also important to recall that Berle’s conception of 
fiduciary duties was inspired by his desire to create a shareholder class-to 
encourage “the middle and working classes . . . [to] . . . entrust their savings, 
through organizations such as savings banks or pension funds, to the security- 
rather than the risk-of the stock exchanges.” Berle wanted to be the “Marx 
of the shareholder class” (B. Berle and Jacobs 1973,26; Schwarz 1987,65).” 
This was his alternative to the Progressive notion of shareholder democracy- 
“the idea of restoring active control to shareholders,” which “held far wider 
appeal at the time” (Hessen 1983, 278-79).32 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property did not endorse share- 
holder democracy because Berle and Means viewed the idea as implausible 
in large business corporations with their dispersed (passive) ownership (Schwarz 
1987,62-68). Berle wanted to make managers trustees for the shareholders 
because he saw shareholders as representing the community. However, by 
the 1950s, when Berle conceded to Dodd, both the idea that shareholders’ 
interests would become a proxy for community welfare and the ideal of a 
shareholder class had dissipated. First, as a 1958 study (by J. A. Livingston) 
of the role of shareholders-as affected by “SEC regulation, extensive dis- 
closure requirements, elaborate proxy machinery, Stock Exchange self- 
discipline, corporate Good Citizenship, People’s Capitalism and Corporate 
Democracy”-demonstrated, shareholders remained passive (or impotent) 
(Manning 1958,1485). More important, shareholders never became a class, 
and in the postwar years they were viewed as merely another interest group. 
For one thing, those who seemed to embrace Berle’s position in his de- 
bate with Dodd (like Eugene Rostow) described shareholders not as a class 
with shared social and political goals, but as individuals sharing an eco- 
nomic (investment) interest (Rostow 1960, 53-54). 
In this atmosphere Berle renounced his early position. I t  was not his 
loss of the appeal in Barlow v. A. P. Smith Manufacturing Company, but rather 
the changing tides of corporate law (and legal thought more broadly) that 
triggered his concession to Dodd. Berle seemed particularly troubled by a 
new image of the corporation, which economists and legal scholars began to 
articulate in the postwar years, and which threatened to eclipse his legal 
pluralist vision. Reflecting the individualist turn in scholarly circles, this new 
vision was presumably meant to emphasize the role of the individual investor 
in the corporation, but in contrast to Berle’s belief that Shareholders’ interests 
could serve as a means of constraining corporate power, this new vision sought 
to empower shareholders to pursue their own interests-specifically profit. 
Given his social and political sensibilities, Berle feared that this new 
vision of the corporation would be detrimental to the American economy, a 
31. On the contentious relationship between pluralism and class, see Tsuk 2003. 
32. Indeed, as Progressives explored union democracy, they also examined the possibility 
of shareholder democracy. Both visions rested on the assumption that groups had to be 
controlled by their members. 
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fear that recent corporate scandals might have proven justifiable. With this 
in mind, Berle not only embraced a more favorable view of corporate man- 
agement (1960, xiii), but also conceded to Dodd. In an attempt to  save the 
message of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, and the legal plu- 
ralist vision more broadly, Berle, again, made managers trustees for the com- 
munity. Emphasizing managers’ duties toward the community at  large was 
Berle’s response to the rising tides of individualism. Yet, as the following part 
concludes, neither Berle nor Means could save modern corporate theory from 
the individualist turn. Sadly, they could not even save their own book from 
being functionally rewritten or misinterpreted. 
PART 111: 1983-THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY TRANSFORMED 
The New Economic Theory of the Firm 
One of the most striking characteristics of The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property was the absence of theoretical economics. While Means 
was an economist, his chief contribution was his statistical studies. Beyond 
these studies, “[elxcept for an occasional citation to Adam Smith and one to 
Thorstein Veblen’s Absentee Ownership, there was no discussion of eco- 
nomic literature” in the book. As the first part of this essay demonstrated, 
for the most part, The Modern Corporation and Private Property was meant 
to bring the political theory of pluralism to bear upon legal doctrine. In- 
deed, “most economists ignored Berle and Means.” For one thing, Ronald 
Coase, whose pathbreaking article, “The Nature of the Firm,” was published 
only five years after the publication of The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, “never cited Berle’s and Means’s work and virtually ignored the 
‘legal’ literature on the structure of the business firm” (Hovenkamp 1988, 
1684). 
The separation between law and economics, as it was reflected in The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property and in its reception among econ- 
omists, was not surprising. Like other strands of Progressive legal thought, 
Berle and Means’s legal pluralism was informed by a marginalist economic 
theory, which justified “widespread, state-enforced wealth distribution and 
intervention in the market.” In turn, the mainstream of economic thought 
beginning in the 1910s was “increasingly skeptical, indifferent and even- 
tually hostile toward concepts of social value-or  to any concept of value 
that could not be defined strictly in terms of individual preference,” and 
thus “increasingly strict and pessimistic about the science of measuring 
welfare.” The result was a sharp separation of law and economics in 
American thought from the 1930s through the 1960s. Mainstream econo- 
mists developed “the neoclassical theory of competition,’, while legal scholars 
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continued to rely on regulatory agencies to allocate resources (Hovenkamp 
The shift in legal and political theory-from collective institutions 
to individuals as the foundation for the modem state-coupled with the 
growing faith in the power of economic and political markets to produce the 
common good, opened a door for the reintroduction of economics into law. 
As (progressive) legal scholars’ concerns shifted from wealth and class to- 
ward a wide range of indicia of lack of privilege, including “race, extremist 
political or social views, indigent criminal defendants, alienage, and even- 
tually gender, affectional preferences and disabilities,” the cohesion of their 
thought gradually disintegrated. The only common thread seemed to be in- 
dividual preferences (Hovenkamp 2000, 860-61). In such an atmosphere, 
the new economic theory of the firm emerged. 
Prior to the 1970s, neoclassical economics focused its theorizing efforts 
on markets and declined to theorize about the corporation’s internal struc- 
ture. Accordingly, the firm was a “black box”; i t  followed “profit consid- 
erations exclusively” as “an entity in rational patterns no different from those 
of human actors,” and market forces were deemed to control managerial 
power (Bratton 1989a, 1495-96). The relationship between the actors within 
the box remained the terrain of legal doctrine, as it was developed in the 
courts, and of “organization theory specialists’’ (Williamson 1983, 365). 
Then, as the gap between law and economics was being bridged, neo- 
classical economists (many of whom were influenced by Ronald Coase’s 
analytical juxtaposition of markets and organizations) turned to corporate 
structure (and legal doctrine) (Williamson 1983, 365; Bratton 1989a, 
1498). Their new economic theory of the firm offered a picture of the cor- 
poration that fit the market-centered economic policies of the postwar years 
and their culmination in the 1 9 8 O ~ . ~ ~  Rather than putting management hi- 
erarchies and the need to constrain corporate power at the center of the 
corporate paradigm, the new economic theory of the firm found a way around 
hierarchy and regulation by drawing on microeconomics to describe cor- 
porate entities as nexuses of private, contractual relationships and to paint a 
new picture of the firm and economic markets in which “hierarchy [was] ir- 
relevant.” The corporation was merely a collection of “disaggregated but 
interrelated transactions” among individuals (or between them and the fic- 
tive entity, “as a matter of convenience”) (Bratton 198913, 416-20). 
The new theory of the firm supported a shift of focus in scholarly 
debates-from questions of power, influence, sanctions and legitimacy to 
2000,810-11,836). 
33 .  As commentators have demonstrated, despite “record inflation[,] . . . the worst re- 
cession since the 1930s,” and the flourishing of proposals for different economic planning at 
the state and federal level, by the early 1980s, the U.S. economic policy heavily relied on 
market allocation of resources. The concerted efforts of the new, sufficiently unified class of 
business leaders and large investors helped reduce to a minimum constraints on capital, either 
by organized labor or the state (Akard 1992, 600-608). 
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issues of cost reduction and profit maximization (Bratton 1989a, 1498). 
Investors, managers, workers, and all other corporate constituencies were 
presumed to be self-interested wealth-maximizers operating in formally free 
markets. Concerns about managerial expertise were translated into ques- 
tions about economic efficiency, and managers described corporate activi- 
ties in the social sphere as “the pursuit of profit.” Public problems such as 
discrimination and growing disparities of wealth were depicted as providing 
industries with “opportunities for growth and profit’’ (Blumberg 1972, 5 ;  
Zeitlin 1974, 1094-97). 
Those who embraced the new economic theory of the firm were quick 
to denounce the concerns about corporate power as articulated in The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property. As early as 1962, in a review essay 
of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Henry Manne, for example, 
announced that Berle and Means’s predictions about the detrimental eco- 
nomic effects of the concentration of corporate power, as well as calls for the 
reform of corporate law that drew on Berle and Means’s analysis, were wrong- 
headed. According to Manne, those who expressed concerns about the real 
impact of shareholders’ votes neglected to recognize the relationship be- 
tween share voting and share transferability (407-13). In turn, those who 
advocated business statesmanship did not realize that statesmanship mattered 
only when “the degree of monopoly in the economy” was high. As Manne put 
it, when the economy functioned in a competitive way, non-profit-maximizing 
activities would take place only if “the shareholders [had] agreed to operate 
something other than a purely business association” (413-18). Finally, those 
who called for the application of constitutional standards to corporations 
failed to understand that when “all important activities of individuals or 
private associations [had to] meet some nebulous standard of ‘social purpose,’ 
freedom as we [had] known and yearned for it [would] have disappeared” 
(423-30). 
What, then, was left of the message of The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property? As Manne saw it, the only theme of the book that was worth 
examining was the separation of ownership from control in the modern 
corporation. Manne described this theme as the “central theme” of the book, 
and “one that [had] found most general acceptance” (39911.00). Then, he 
called on scholars to recognize the concerns about efficiency that the sepa- 
ration of ownership from control triggered and to study how capital markets 
could eliminate such concerns (430-32). 
In other words, even with respect to the narrow problem of the sepa- 
ration of ownership from control, Manne rejected Berle and Means’s con- 
clusions. While Berle and Means tied the separation of ownership from 
control to the corporation’s ability to amass power, Manne dismissed any 
concerns about corporate power. While Berle and Means emphasized that 
because of the separation of ownership from control, “competition could no 
longer be trusted to guarantee efficient corporate behavior” (Hovenkamp 
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1988, 1684), Manne suggested that market competition was a means of 
bridging the gap between ownership and control. 
This was also the message of a series of articles evaluating the im- 
portance of The Modern Corporation and Private Property that were published 
in 1983 in the Journal of Law and Economics. The authors of these articles, 
almost exclusively members of the burgeoning law and economics move- 
ment, implicitly engaged Manne’s call. As the following sections elaborate, 
together they so transformed the message of The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property that even its authors could not recognize the book. 
The (Profitable) Separation of Ownership from Control 
The papers published in volume 26 of the Journal o f h w  and Ecomm- 
ics were produced for a conference, Corporations and Private Property, held 
by the Hoover Institution in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property. Being a celebration, it began with 
commemorative introductory remarks (by Thomas Gale Moore), which sug- 
gested that the book tremendously influenced different reform ideas, includ- 
ing Ralph Nader’s proposal for federal incorporation laws, Tom Hayden’s 
proposal for corporate democracy, and even the German policy of code- 
termination (1983, 236). 
However inaccurate the suggestion that the book influenced all these 
movements was, the tribute to the book’s social and political legacy ended 
with these remarks. The following papers transformed The Modern Corpora- 
tion and Private Property into a book concerned not with corporate power, as it 
was, but with the separation of ownership from control. For example, George 
J. Stigler and Claire Friedland asserted that the theme of The Modern Cor- 
poration and Private Property was the emergence of “a new era of economic 
organization because of the separation of ownership and control.” Noting 
Berle and Means’s exploration of the “growing concentration of economic 
power in large corporations,” Stigler and Friedland dismissed it as “no nec- 
essary part of the separation of ownership and control,” and indeed as an 
exploration serving merely “to emphasize the social urgency of the problem 
of controlling the large corporation” ( 238-39).34 Leonard Weiss further 
asserted that aggregate concentration fell sharply after 1929, making Berle 
and Means’s concerns about corporate power irrelevant (448). And Harold 
Demsetz simply began by noting that “[tlhe separation of ownership from 
34. In a symposium held at the University of California in Los Angeles also in 1983, 
George A. Stigler was quoted to have said the following (provoking laughter from the au- 
dience): “[Betle and Means] planted once and for all the idea that the two hundred largest 
corporations in America are bigger than the other biggest corporations [laughter] and that the 
ownership and control of the modem corporation are wholly separated from one another” 
(Kitch 1983, 174). 
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control in the modern corporation, an issue brought to the fore so effectively 
by Berle and Means fifty years ago, retains a central position in recent writings 
about the economic theory of the firm” (375). 
Having shifted attention from corporate power to the separation of 
ownership from control, the conference participants went on to demon- 
strate that the problem, truly, was not a problem. First, they proclaimed that 
it could not be a problem as all actors in the corporate endeavor preferred it. 
For example, Hessen argued that investors were not only “free to choose,” 
but also presented with “rich and diverse choices.” They supplied capital 
“because they [had] sufficient savings they [were] willing to entrust to the 
managerial skills of others, in return for a share in the resulting profits” (285- 
89). Easterbrook and Fischel asserted that investors knew how to protect their 
interests contractually, and Demsetz concluded that shareholders chose to be 
passive investors because it allowed them to maximize their profits. If needed, 
they could and would become active-through takeovers, proxy fights, and 
purchase of control (387-90). 
Furthermore, according to the conference participants, not only was 
the separation of ownership from control the preferred choice of inves- 
tors, but it also proved to be an efficient choice. For one thing, Stigler and 
Friedland announced that their “statistical analyses, using only data and meth- 
ods familiar to economists of the [ 1930~1, yield[ed] no clear evidence that the 
management-dominated corporations differed much from owner-dominated 
companies . . . in the utilization of assets to produce profits’’ (259). Demsetz 
declared that, in fact, there was no real distinction between investors’ and 
managements’ interests. Rather, both groups shared a “considerable interest 
in profit-maximizing behavior” (390). Finally, Eugene Fama and Michael 
Jensen asserted that organizational forms survived because of the “compar- 
ative advantages of characteristics of residual claims in controlling the 
agency problems” (1983a, 345), and that “the contract structure’’ of the mod- 
ern corporation, by separating “the ratification and monitoring of decisions 
from initiation and implementation of decisions,” effectively controlled “the 
agency problems caused by separation of decision and risk-bearing func- 
tions” (1983b, 302). 
Of course, once the separation of ownership from control was proven not 
to be a problem, Berle and Means’s proposed legal regime could easily be 
dismissed. In this vein, the conference participants wholeheartedly rejected 
the idea that corporations were trustees for the community. As Hessen pointedly 
explained, investors’ (free) decision 
to entrust their wealth to professional managers [did] not make 
them, as Berle and Means claim[ed], inactive and irresponsible. Their 
rights should be protected, not eroded, as Berle and Means propose[d] 
when they [said] that the shareholders “by surrendering control and 
responsibility . . . have released the community from the obligation to 
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protect them to the full extent implied in the doctrine of strict property 
rights.” (289) 
But even more modest (progressive) suggestions of imposing a regime 
of fiduciary duties toward shareholders or strengthening shareholders voting 
power were rejected as interferences with the voluntary nature of partici- 
pation in the firm’s activities. For example, Easterbrook and Fischel criti- 
cized all constraints on shareholders’ voting, specifically those imposed by 
the securities acts of 1933 and 1934, as unnecessary and leading to  ineffi- 
cient results. “These rules,” they wrote, “displace[d] voluntary arrangements 
as codified in the common law rules and thus impose[d] costs that probably 
outweigh[ed] any benefits” (427). In turn, Demsetz undermined all forms of 
mandatory fiduciary duties by explaining that “[iln a world in which self- 
interest play[ed] a significant role in economic behavior, it [was] foolish 
to believe that owners of valuable resources systematically relinquish[ed] 
control to managers who [were] not guided to serve their interests.” The 
legal system could thus trust the self-interested shareholders to discipline 
management (if necessary) through market power (390; Ricardo-Campbell 
1983). The firm’s contracts were supposed (“priced”) to take management 
self-interest, including excessive self-dealing, into account, and the legal com- 
munity could assume that if the shareholders did not accept certain behavior, 
it would become too costly and disappear. Not even a supplemental legal 
regime of fiduciary duties was necessary (Bratton 1989a, 1499). 
Indeed, while calling attention away from corporate power and toward 
Berle and Means’s exegesis of the separation of ownership from control might 
seem a mere shift in emphasis, the conference participants well recognized 
that it was also a means to an end. The phenomenon of the separation of own- 
ership from control could be employed to legitimate different legal regimes. 
Berle and Means used it to support their argument about corporate power 
and corporate duties. In a similar manner, as Demsetz elaborated, many social 
critics, from Veblen to Galbraith, used it to justify giving expert manage- 
ment, rather than individual capitalists, the power efficiently to run the cor- 
poration (376). The conference participants, and advocates of the new 
economic theory of the firm more broadly, called for a different usage-one 
that focused on capital markets and the (presumably) common search for 
profit. In their hands, the endurance and seeming effectiveness of the sepa- 
ration of ownership from control helped legitimate the idea that market 
competition and the search for profit were the only means of regulating 
corporate power. As such, the separation of ownership from control became a 
solution rather than a problem-it was the ultimate way to allow self-inter- 
ested investors to profit. 
In short, reading The Modern Corporation and Private Property as a book 
about the separation of ownership from control helped minimize the con- 
cerns that Berle and Means expressed about corporate power and negate 
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Berle and Means’s regulatory solution, which viewed corporations as public 
trustees. At the same time it also helped legitimate a different solution-a 
market-oriented solution. Informed by the individualist turn of the postwar 
years, the law and economics scholars of the 1970s and 1980s turned the 
corporation-a social, economic, and political organization-into a con- 
tractual arrangement, a tool of making profits for  investor^.^' Even at the 
turn of the 21st century, after the market has proven to be less efficient in 
regulating corporate activities, the self-interested search for profit has re- 
mained the theme underlying corporate law. 
Gone was Berle and Means’s concern with corporate power, gone was 
their concern with managerial fiduciary duties. All that was left was a book 
about efficiency and profit. All that was left was a book about which Gardiner 
Means, writing in response to one of the papers in the symposium, said 
the following: “I find great difficulty in recognizing the book described by 
Dr. Hessen as the book we wrote fifty years ago” (198313,297). 
Berle and Means’s Lost Battle 
Proponents of the new economic theory of the firm were adamant 
about rejecting Berle and Means’s emphasis on power and the need to 
constrain corporate power (either through a judicial-based trust doctrine or 
federal regulation). Both Berle and Means’s concern and their remedy un- 
dermined the individualist, profit-oriented, vision of the corporation. Writ- 
ing, ahistorically, more than five decades after the New Deal had transformed 
the corporation, they could not appreciate Berle and Means’s concerns. As 
Berle sharply put it in his response to Manne in 1962: 
Professor Manne and his contemporaries did not live through World 
War I and the decade of the twenties, and the crash of 1929, culmi- 
nating in the breakdown of the American economic system in 1933. 
They have not experienced a corporate and financial world without the 
safeguards of the Securities and Exchange Commission, without sys- 
temization and enforced publicity of corporate accounting, without 
(more or less) consistent application of antitrust laws, without dis- 
couragement of financial pyramiding, and which tolerated conflicts of 
interest to a degree unthinkable now. They have not experienced a 
35 .  As Fama and Jensen put it: “An organization is the nexus of contracts, written and 
unwritten among owners of factors of production and customers. These contracts or internal 
‘rules of the game’ specify the rights of each agent in the organization, performance criteria on 
which agents are evaluated, and the payoff functions they face. The contract structure 
combines with available production technologies and external legal constraints to determine 
the cost function for delivering an output with a particular form of organization. The form of 
organization that delivers the output demanded by customers at the lowest price, while 
covering costs, survives” (1983b, 302). 
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banking, credit, and currency system unguided by the Federal Reserve 
Board. Least of all have they lived in a political-economic world in 
which great corporations were not consistently held by active public 
opinion to public responsibility. (433) 
I t  did not surprise Berle that the new generation of corporate law 
scholars, given their lack of firsthand knowledge, turned to the classical, 
“nineteenth century economic postulate that the free market under com- 
petitive conditions [was] the best” (435). But, Berle emphasized, this as- 
sumption could not be sustained given the economic changes that took 
place in the 20th century, specifically the aggregation of corporate power. 
Indeed, according to Berle, because they did not understand the importance 
of power and hierarchy to the corporate structure, advocates of the new 
theory of the firm could describe the shareholders’ vote, which Berle viewed 
as merely a “ritual,” as meaningful. Because they endorsed the classical (or 
neoclassical) economic vision of the rational, profit-maximizing actor, they 
could not realize that business statesmanship was real and not always “dic- 
tated by market conditions.” Finally, because they refused to recognize the 
realities of corporate power, they misconceived the nature of corporate en- 
tities. “In fact,” Berle stressed, “a large corporation is a variety of non-statist 
political institution” (442-45). 
For Berle, writing three decades after the publication of The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, the problem remained corporate power, and 
this question of power remained entangled with the question of passive 
property. Neither, however, could be answered by reference to 19th-century 
conceptions of property. As Berle reiterated, what the separation of owner- 
ship and control indicated, in 1932 and in 1962, was the need for new social 
and political concepts of property and corporations. 
Berle’s 1962 solution to the problem of power focused on the nature 
of shareholding. Still, like his earlier solutions, Berle’s 1962 discussion of 
shareholding focused on the social and political nature of ownership, spe- 
cifically corporate ownership. Just as Reich sought to give individuals enti- 
tlements to government benefits, Berle grounded the ownership of shares 
in social reasons, emphasizing the “value attached to individual life, indi- 
vidual development, individual solution of personal problems, individual 
choice of consumption and activity.” Shareholding allowed for an equi- 
table distribution of these goods; and shares were, accordingly, not an en- 
titlement but a mechanism of wealth distribution (1965, 17). As Berle 
elaborated: 
Passive property . . . loses its “capital” function and becomes increas- 
ingly an exclusive means for distributing liquid wealth, and a channel 
for distributing income whose accumulation for capital purposes is not 
required. . . .Beyond that., .the right to choose consumption-to spend 
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if and as you please-will be guarded as a defense of the individual’s 
right to order his own life. (20) 
In 1967, in the preface to the revised edition of The Modern C O ~ O -  
ration and Private Property, Berle reiterated his conclusions. He described the 
ongoing current toward collective (or corporate) capitalism; he redrew the 
distinction between consumption property (which allowed individuals to 
express their personality) and productive property (which was subject to 
constitutional limitations); finally, he emphasized the role of passive prop- 
erty in distributing wealth. “There is,” Betle concluded, “increasing rec- 
ognition of the fact that collective operations, and those predominantly 
conducted by large corporations, are like operations carried on by the state 
itself.” Accordingly, corporations were “political constructs”: “Their per- 
petual life, their capacity to accumulate tens of billions of assets, and to 
draw profit from their production and their sales, has made them part of the 
service of supply of the United States. Informally they are an adjunct of the 
state itself” (196713, xxvi-xxvii). 
Means shared Berle’s conclusions. In 1967, in his preface to the re- 
vised edition, Means noted that the corporate revolution created “centers 
of economic power on a scale never previously known.” In turn, the sepa- 
ration of ownership and control “has released management from the over- 
riding requirement that it serve stockholders.” In short, Means continued to 
stress that The Modern Corporation and Private Property illustrated that the 
growth of corporate power demanded new concepts to replace the old con- 
cepts of “wealth, enterprise, initiative, the profit motive, and competition” 
(xxxiv-xxxv). 
In 1983, Means reiterated his call. Writing in response to one of the 
papers in the conference Corporations and Private Property, Means com- 
plained that by limiting their perception of the book to what it said about 
the separation of ownership from control, the participants failed to realize 
that the main thrust of the book concerned “the effect of the modem 
corporation on the working of the economy as a whole” (198313, 297-98). 
Specifically, they failed to recognize the crucial question of the book: “HOW 
can public policies that can work reasonably well when most enterprises are 
small, closely held, and highly competitive, be expected to work when an 
important part of production is carried on by giant enterprises with dis- 
persed ownership and fewer competitors?” (300). According to Means, the 
most important contribution of the book was the chapter on the concen- 
tration of economic power (1983a, 469). 
In short, according to Berle and Means, not the microeconomic 
question of the separation of ownership from control, but the macroeco- 
nomic problem of power underlay the concerns that they expressed in The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property. It was the problem of corporate 
power that called for the creation of new concepts. It was the problem of 
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power that advocates of the economic theory of the firm were trying to 
eradicate, but it was that problem, too, that made The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property an enduring book. 
Yet, enduring as the book’s legacy was, it could not stop the neo- 
classical vision from having the upper hand or from rewriting the book’s 
message. In 1962, Berle labeled Manne’s approach “a last ditch stand of the 
nineteenth-century school” (436). In 1967, both Berle and Means seemed 
optimistic about the possibility of developing new concepts. But in 1983, 
twelve years after Berle’s death, Means was fighting a lost battle. Conclud- 
ing his article for the conference, Corporations and Private Property, he wrote: 
I must reiterate our conclusions that: “competition has changed in 
character and the principles applicable to present conditions are rad- 
ically different from those which apply when the dominant competing 
units are smaller and more numerous”; and that “New concepts must 
be forged and a new picture of economic relationship created.” (1983a, 
485 1 
For Means these words continued to ring urgently, but in 1983 the new 
economic theory of the firm, which has shifted the focus of corporate law 
and theory from questions of social and economic power to the maximi- 
zation of value for investors-from new (collectivist) concepts to old (in- 
dividualist) ones-has so transformed Berle and Means’s words that the true 
(and lasting) meaning of their book seems to have disappeared from our 
collective memory. 
EPILOGUE 
In 1959, Robert Dahl proclaimed that the early discourse of pluralism, 
which provided political scientists and lawyers alike with tools to examine 
the business corporation as a political order, was lost. Specifically, Dahl 
noted that while political scientists remained interested in “the relatively 
well established field of government regulation in the broad sense,” they 
had left the study of the internal order of the corporation to economists. 
According to Dahl, in so doing, political theorists helped remove “questions 
of power, influence, sanctions, [and] legitimacy”-that is, questions of govem- 
ment and political order-from the study of the firm. Dahl wanted his au- 
dience to rerecognize the importance of these questions to the study of 
corporations. “A business firm,” he stressed, “like a trade union, religious 
organization, or state, [had] a political order” (3-6). 
This was indeed the assumption underlying The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property. Berle and Means described corporations as real entities 
and called attention to the fact that corporations exercised power, which 
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resembled the power of the sovereign state, and which could not be abso- 
lutely curbed. “TO us,” Berle declared, “there is much to indicate that the 
process will go a great deal further than it has now gone” (p. viii). Given the 
reality of corporate power, Berle and Means urged their audience to study 
the modern corporation “as a human institution” (p. viii). Then, Berle and 
Means sought, even if unsuccessfully, to articulate legal rules that would 
tame or channel corporate power to the benefit of society. 
In 1959 Dahl was not certain why the early discourse of pluralism, of 
which he was well aware, was lost. “What seems to have happened,” he 
wrote, “is that the Great Depression and the New Deal turned the attention 
of political scientists away from explaining behavior to prescribing policy” 
(1 7-19). 
This essay offered a different narrative. I argued that Berle and Means’s 
pluralist vision influenced much of the New Deal regulatory programs, but 
in the course of the years that followed, it was eclipsed by a different vision 
of the state-an individualist one. As I further argued, this individualist 
vision was reflected in Keynesian economics, in Dahl’s neopluralism, in the 
modern discourse of civil rights, and ultimately in the new economic theory 
of the firm, which described business corporations as nexuses of contractual 
relations between individuals, subject only to the regulation of capital 
markets. 
Advocates of the new economic theory of the firm helped obscure the 
legacy of The Modem Corporation and Private Property, turning it into a book 
about the separation of ownership from control, not about corporate power. 
But corporate power is real. Today, corporations capture every aspect of our 
lives. They contribute to political campaigns, own and control the mass 
media and rapidly the Internet. Their actions affect families and individuals. 
Multinational and world trade organizations have changed the nature of eco- 
nomic and political markets, coordinating economic activity across politi- 
cal, cultural, and social boundaries. If the turn of the 20th century witnessed 
the nationalization of the business corporation with the creation of multi- 
state corporations, the 21st century confronts the internationalization of the 
business corporation. Global corporations weaken the capacity of individual 
countries to control their internal economies, while simultaneously further- 
ing the consolidation of a global society. In this context, the true legacy of 
The Modem Corporation and Private Property endures. It is left to us, the read- 
ers, to preserve its vitality. 
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